Emissaries

At the conclusion of the Torah-reading of Toldos it states that "Yitzchak sent (vayishlach) Yaakov, and he went...."[80] This passage is the first in which the Torah speaks of appointing and sending an emissary, a shaliach.[81]

While the previous portion of Chayei Sarah speaks at length about Avraham's sending Eliezer on a mission, however, Eliezer was sent as a slave, an eved, and not as a shaliach. This is emphasized immediately at the beginning of the section when it states, "And Avraham said to his eved."[82] This is further reinforced when Eliezer begins his remarks by stating, "I am an eved of Avraham."[83]

Although both shaliach and eved share a common theme and goal -- serving as a proxy for their master or dispatcher, nevertheless it is evident that eved and shaliach are two entirely different entities:

The notion of appointing an emissary -- shlichus -- is that the individual who appoints the emissary, the mishaleiach, transfers the task to a different person, that the other person accomplish the task for him.

It is true that the actions of the shaliach are efficacious only because the mishaleiach gave him (through appointing him as his shaliach) the power that he become the "counterpart" of the mishaleiach. Still, the manner in which the mishaleiach vests the shaliach is that of one person empowering another -- that the second person have the power to accomplish the task.

This is not at all so when one tells his slave to do something. In this instance, since the slave is the "possession" of the master and is not an entity unto himself, it is considered as if the master has actually himself accomplished the task on his own.

The difference between the two is the following. The description shaliach is an estimable title, denoting a comparable and honorable relationship between the shaliach and the mishaleiach -- the shaliach is "just like"[84] ("k'moso") the mishaleiach.

Moreover, in order to become a shaliach, the shaliach must be similar to the mishaleiach even before he becomes a shaliach, for which reason our Sages compare shaliach and mishaleiach -- "Just as you etc., so, too, your shaliach."[85] This enables him to be "just like" the mishaleiach once he is appointed as shaliach.

Eved on the other hand, denotes the person's lowliness: Not only is he not a "master" (one who rules over another), he is not even one who rules over himself -- he is not a "free man."

Because of this difference in their inherent status, there arises the difference as to who is actually accomplishing the task. Since the shaliach is akin to the mishaleiach, he himself therefore has the capacity to himself consummate the mission in a manner that is as if the mishaleiach himself had done it.

An eved's accomplishment for his master on the other hand, is not as if the eved himself had achieved it, since he is not similar to his master and therefore cannot act in his stead. To the contrary, because he is not an entity unto himself but entirely his master's acquisition, therefore that which he does is considered his master's doing -- something the master does through an entity that is nothing other than an extension of himself.

We accordingly understand the novelty of the lesson in divine service that we derive from the section of Toldos that speaks of shlichus as compared to the section of Chayei Sarah that speaks of eved:

In addition to our being G-d's avodim (the plural of eved), as the verse states, "For the children of Israel are avodim unto me,"[86] G-d also appointed us as His shluchim[87] (the plural of shaliach). This latter appellation contains a twofold quality:

Firstly, it indicates the prominence of the Jewish people, that even before they became His shluchim, they are similar, as it were, to G-d, for which reason they have the capacity to become His shluchim. Even more so, after they are appointed His shluchim, when they are "just like" Him.

Secondly, all that we accomplish is deemed to be through our own service, something that is much more satisfying, as "A person desires one measure of something that he has accomplished himself, more than nine measures granted to him by another."[88]

Although these accomplishments are achieved through the power that G-d vests in us, nevertheless, G-d confers upon us the ability that these accomplishments are actually ours.

For as explained above regarding a shaliach: though the shaliach is empowered by the mishaleiach to act in his stead, still this power is handed over to the shaliach, that he be able to accomplish the task at hand.

Moreover, the aspect of shaliach also accomplishes the purpose of creation, G-d having "earnestly desired an abode in this lowly world."[89] This is actualized specifically when this is accomplished by the "lowly" themselves, using their character and personality and by dint of their own service -- shaliach, rather than merely being an extension of Above -- eved.

Based on Sefer HaSichos 5748, Vol. I, pp. 93-95.

Duplicity

At the conclusion of the section Toldos, the verse states: "Esav saw that the daughters of Canaan were evil in Yitzchak's eyes. So Esav went to Yishmael, and married Machlas the daughter of Yishmael ... in addition to his other wives." Why does the Torah feel the need to inform us about Esav's marriage to Machlas?

Rashi explains that by marrying Machlas, Esav "added new evil to his previous evil, as he did not divorce his first [evil] wives." How can we say that Esav's new evil at the time he married Machlas consisted of his not then divorcing his first wives, when in any case he should have divorced them -- as they were so evil -- long before he married Machlas?

Esav's evil in marrying his first wives involved much more than taking wives whose evil ways were a source of irritation and bitterness to his parents Yitzchak and Rivkah.[90] It also consisted of his deceit and fraud in marrying these women:

For as Rashi notes on the verse[91] "Esav was forty years old when he married..." -- "Esav is compared to a swine that, when it lies down, stretches out its cloven hoof, as if to say, 'See, I am a kosher animal!' ... Similarly, during his first forty years Esav would capture married women from their husbands... When he turned forty, he said [deceitfully], 'Father married at forty; I, too, shall do so."

That is to say, these marriages were, in fact, fraudulent and deceitful, as he married out of the desire that he be thought of as conducting himself in the same righteous manner as his father, Yitzchak.

This is also what the verse and Rashi imply when stating that Esav "married Machlas the daughter of Yishmael ... in addition to his other wives," adding "new evil to his previous evil, as he did not divorce his first [evil] wives":

Just as Esav's first marriages were deceitful, so too was his marriage to Machlas -- he married a righteous women[92] only so that people think he was repenting from his old ways and former marriages. This was a matter of pure deceit. The proof of this lay in the fact that he did not divorce his first wives.

There is an important lesson here for us all. According to Rashi's explanation, Esav's evil in marrying Machlas was his fraudulence and deceit. That is to say, the fault of Esav's deceit lay not only in his fooling others, but also in the very fact of acting in a fraudulent and deceitful manner.

This will be better understood by comparing how Esav conducted himself in relation to his father, as opposed to his conduct with his brother, Yaakov: Esav tried to fool his father into thinking that he, Esav, was a truly righteous individual, while Esav openly opposed Yaakov in out and out confrontation and battle.

These two evil manners in which Esav conducted himself serve as a lesson in every Jew's spiritual service in combating evil. There are two manners of evil: manifest evil, and evil that is couched and concealed in goodness.

Just as one must stand fast against revealed evil -- evil that cannot be mistaken for anything but for which it is, so too and even more so, must we be on guard against the admixture of good and evil -- concealed evil. In fact, the battle against the latter form of evil is the more difficult battle of the two.

Thus we find that Yaakov's confrontation with Esav lasted but one day, while his stay at Lavan's house was of twenty years duration. This was because Lavan's evil toward Yaakov was one of duplicity and deceit -- hidden evil that takes a long time to overcome, while Esav's conduct toward Yaakov was manifest evil -- something much easier to vanquish.[93]

We may well say that the duplicity and fraud of Esav vis-a-vis Yitzchak was even worse than the duplicity and fraud perpetrated by Lavan against Yaakov. For evil can be concealed within good in two ways,

1. concealing the evil to the greatest extent possible,

2. emphasizing and publicizing the good.

Herein lay the difference between Lavan and Esav. Lavan merely fooled Yaakov, so that he not recognize his evil intentions. Esav, however, acted toward his father like "a swine that stretches out its cloven hoof, saying, 'See, I am a kosher animal!'" Not only does he hide his "unkosher" sign, he also endeavors to publicize how "kosher" he is. The labor involved in expelling this latter form of duplicity is far more difficult than banishing the former.

This also explains why the Torah finds it necessary to report Esav's marriage to Machlas. By doing so the Torah reveals how colossal was Esav's evil and duplicity -- taking a fine woman while remaining as evil as before, all for the sake of being thought of as a penitent.

This teaches each and every one of us how much we are to distance ourselves from duplicity: It is possible that the evil inclination will even allow a person to perform good deeds for the sake of duplicity, while in truth, the person's evil has not departed from him at all!

Based on Likkutei Sichos, Vol. XXXV, pp. 113-117

   

Notes:

80. (Back to text) Bereishis 28:5.

81. (Back to text) "He sent the dove," (Noach 8:8) does not qualify, as only a thinking human being can be appointed an emissary. (See Gittin 23a)

82. (Back to text) Bereishis 24:2.

83. (Back to text) Ibid., verse 34.

84. (Back to text) "A person's emissary is 'just like' the person himself -- Mishnah, Berachos 34b, Kiddushin 41b.

85. (Back to text) Kiddushin, ibid. See Likkutei Torah, Vayikra 1c.

86. (Back to text) Vayikra 25:55. See also Tanya, chapter 41 (57a).

87. (Back to text) See Likkutei Torah, ibid.

88. (Back to text) Bava Metzia 38a.

89. (Back to text) See Tanchuma, Naso 16, Bechukosai 3; Bamidbar Rabbah 13:6; Tanya, beginning of chapter 36.

90. (Back to text) Bereishis 26:5 and commentary of Rashi; ibid., 27:46.

91. (Back to text) Bereishis 26:35.

92. (Back to text) See Rashi, Bereishis 36:3.

93. (Back to text) See Maamarei Admur HaZakein -- HaKetzarim (pp. 452-3). See also Or HaTorah, Vayeitzei 222a; Sefer HaMaamarim 5678, p. 83.