Likkutei Sichos, Vol. VI, p. 86ff.

I

On the verse:[1] "And towards morning, the sea turned back to its power," the Midrash[2] states that when G-d created the sea, He established a condition [for its existence] with it: that it should split for the Jewish people when they desired to pass through. This is alluded to by the term Le'Eisano, "to its power," whose letters can be rearranged to form the word L'tnaoi,[3] "as per its condition", i.e., the sea turned back to its power; it turned [back] because of the condition established with it at the outset.

There is, however, a conceptual difficulty. The verse "And... the sea turned back to its power" speaks, (not about the splitting of the sea, but on the contrary,) about what transpired afterwards when the sea returned to the state it was in before it split. How then can the Midrash associate the return of the sea "to its power" with the condition which G-d established with it at the outset?

The commentaries[4] answer that the condition that G-d stipulated with the sea (that it should split for the Jewish people) was that if it did not split for the Jews, it would never contain water again. {As Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair told the river Ginei (when the river refused to split for him):[5] "If you do not split for me, I will decree that water will never pass through you again."}

On that basis, they explain the statement of the Midrash that the return of the sea to its power reflected the fulfillment of its condition. For if it had not fulfilled its condition, its existence would have been nullified entirely.

This resolution is, however, not entirely satisfactory [for the following reasons]:[6]

1. Had the sea not fulfilled its condition (not only would it not have had any strength, it would have ceased to exist entirely). As Rashi indicates, however, the word Le'Eisano, only alludes to the sea's power, [not to the totality of its existence]. [Why then is its power associated with the fulfillment of its condition?]

2. The literal interpretation of the word L'tnaoi is "to its condition," the sea turned back to its condition. According to the above interpretation, by contrast, it appears that the sea turned back to its power because it fulfilled the condition established with it. The returning itself, however, does not involve its condition.

II

There is a maamar in the text Or Torah that was collected from the Maggid of Mezeritch's teachings (which he in turn attributes to the Baal Shem Tov[7]) that focuses on the verse: "And towards morning, the sea turned back to its power." The Maggid also focuses on the association of the sea's "power" and the condition established with it as stated by the Midrash. Using this Midrash, {he explains the expression used by our Sages:[8] "fulfilling the will of the Omnipresent," rather than fulfilling His word or His utterance,[9] and also} the answer given by Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair to the river Ginei mentioned above: "If you do not split for me, I will decree that water will never pass through you again."

Since G-d established a condition with the entire creation[10] "that it carry out the will of the righteous even though it is against its nature," if the river Ginei had not fulfilled the condition by splitting, "it would be as if it had never existed at all, as if water had never been created there. And thus water would never pass through it again." In other words, by stating that "water will never pass through you again," Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair was stating more than that the river would be dry in the future. His intent was that since the river was created on the condition that it fulfill the will of the righteous, its entire existence, including its existence up until that time, was dependent on its fulfillment of the condition. For if it had not fulfilled "the condition stipulated at the time of the utterance [which brought it into being]," it would have been as if "it had never been created at all." For it would never have existed in such a manner.

On this basis, we can explain the difficulty raised above: that had the sea not split for the Jews, not only would it have lost its power, its entire existence would have ceased.

The sea's fulfillment of the condition had an effect beyond securing its continued existence (for had it not fulfilled the condition, water would not have flown through it again). {Although it is seemingly inappropriate to say that an entity that has already existed could be nullified [to the extent that it never existed],} had the sea not fulfilled the condition, even its existence until that time would have been nullified. [It would be] nullified as if it had never existed as [an element of] the creation,[11] (to the extent that it would have been "nothingness[12] and non-being as it actually was before[13] the six days of creation"[14]).

Therefore [the fulfillment of] the condition is associated with the power of the sea. Through the fulfillment of the condition, not only did the sea continue to exist afterwards (without change), [but] strength and power was endowed to its previous existence.[15]

This explanation, however, resolves only the first difficulty - why the verse states Le'Eisano, which indicates that the fulfillment of the condition effected only the sea's power, because [the splitting effected] (also[16]) the previous existence of the sea. The second question - that the meaning of the word L'tnaoi is "to its condition" - appears to be unresolved. For the sea did not return "to its condition."

III

The resolution of the above can be understood by prefacing the explanation of the difficulty in the meaning of the term Le'Eisano, "to its power," which required the Midrash to interpret it as L'tnaoi, is "to its condition."[17]

The fact that the Torah tells us that the sea returned Le'Eisano, "to its power," is obviously a new development. [For otherwise, it would not have been necessary to say so. Yet that raises a question:] Why would we think that the fact that G-d "transformed the sea into dry land"[18] weakened the nature of the sea to the extent that even when the sea returned, it no longer had its original strength? Why must the Torah state Le'Eisano, "to its power," to negate such a conception?

One might be able to resolve these questions through explaining that we find {[in general, and] in particular, in connection with the exodus from Egypt,} two types of miracles:[19]

1. Miracles which change the nature [of the entities] which existed previously, for example, the miracle in which Moshe inserted his hand in his bosom and it came out "leprous like snow."[20] After the miracle, Moshe's hand remained leprous; that became its natural state. For it to return to a state of health, [21] a second miracle was necessary to negate the leprosy.[22]

2. Miracles in which the situation created by the miracle remains miraculous, defying nature; for example, the miracle of the transformation of the water into blood. The water remained water; its nature did not change. It is just that [for the Egyptians], its apparent and functional state was blood.[23] Therefore, when the miracle ceased, [another miracle was not necessary to transform the blood back to water]. On the contrary, the change to blood was nullified as a matter of course.[24]

With regard to the matter at hand, the miracle of the splitting of the sea: If the transformation of the sea to dry land meant that the nature of the water changed and it actually became land, the return of the sea would require making a new entity, [making the land, sea]. Therefore the verse states: "the sea turned back to its power," indicating that it returned to the strength which it originally possessed, as Rashi states: "to its original power."[25] For even when it was outwardly dry land, it remained (in its inner state), water.[26]

This interpretation is, however, not sufficient. From the fact that the miracle of the splitting of the sea came about because "G-d propelled the entire sea with a strong east wind throughout the entire night,"[27] it is evident that the sea did not undergo a fundamental change in nature and become dry land. {The fact that the water "stood like a column and like a wall"[28] came about through (the Divine power that enclothed itself[29] in) the east wind that continued blowing the entire time.} [Had that wind stopped, the water would have reverted to its original state. Hence, it is not necessary for the verse:] "And towards morning, the sea turned back to its power," to teach us this concept. Thus, the question remains: What new concept does this verse introduce?

For this reason, the Midrash interprets the verse as meaning that the sea returned {not only to the strength it possessed before it split (for that is not a new concept), but} to the strength with which G-d endowed it at the beginning of creation when He established the condition with it to split for the Jewish people. This strength is immeasurably greater than the strength the sea possesses on its own accord (as will be explained in section V).

This condition was fulfilled when the sea split. Nevertheless, the verse states, "And... the sea turned back to its power," because the strength with which the condition endowed the sea was drawn down to it in a revealed manner (not at the time when it split, but) when it reverted to its original state (as explained in section VI). Through the sea splitting, becoming as dry land, and then reverting to sea, it came "to its power," "to its condition," to the strength endowed it by the condition [G-d established].

IV

To resolve the above, it is necessary to understand why it was necessary for G-d, at the time of the creation, to establish a condition with the sea to split for the Jewish people. On the surface, since G-d is the Master of the world, it is obvious that He has power and jurisdiction over the sea, and can cause it to split without having to establish a condition at the outset.[30]

The concept can be explained as follows: The creation was brought into being "for the sake of the Jewish people and for the sake of the Torah."[31] The intent is {not only that the world exists in order to give the Jews the opportunity to observe the Torah and its mitzvos, as one entity serves another, without having any [inner] connection to [the purpose] itself. Instead,} [the motive is that] the Jews, through their Divine service in the Torah and its mitzvos {and through carrying out [their worldly activities in a manner of] "Know Him in all your ways,"[32] and "All your deeds should be for the sake of heaven,"[33]} should make the world itself a dwelling for G-d.

The intent of making a dwelling for G-d is [making] a dwelling for His essence, like a dwelling for a mortal king, in which his entire essence is found in the dwelling.[34] Accordingly, [the existence of] the world itself has to be [structured] in a manner that enables it to also appreciate the aspect of G-dliness that transcends the G-dliness that was condensed according to the limits of the worlds. (This includes even the Divine power manifest in the creation of the worlds.)[35]

Therefore G-d established a condition with the sea, and with every other entity brought into being during the six days of creation,[36] that when the time came, they would change their nature for the sake of the Jewish people. Had He not established this condition,[37] i.e., had the creation itself not accepted the possibility for miracles and changes in the natural order, the result would be that the miracles and changes in the natural order that come about from the light which is (encompassing, sovev, and) above the worlds[38] would nullify the existence of the worlds.[39] Therefore G-d created the sea (- and all other created beings -) with the condition that it split for the Jewish people.

Torah Law states that when a condition is established beforehand in the proper manner, if the principal does not fulfill the condition, the matter is nullified entirely retroactively. Similarly, in this instance,[40] the manner in which the world was created was that [if it would not enable the Jews to observe the Torah and its mitzvos,] the existence of the creation would be nullified. It would be as if, at the outset, it had not been created. This was intended so that the existence of the sea itself [- and similarly, the entire creation -] should agree[41] to the change of the natural order.

V

Based on the above, it is understood that the condition which G-d stipulated with the sea (and similarly, with all the other created beings at the time of the creation), that it should split for the Jewish people, endowed it with far greater power than it possessed by virtue of its creation itself (as it would have existed without the condition).

When an entity exists for a specific time, and then its existence ceases, even during the time it existed, its existence is weak.[42] Indeed, this weakness is the reason why afterwards, the entity ceases to exist.[43]

Therefore one may conclude that the world (as it exists in its own right, by virtue of its being brought into being by the Ten Utterances of Creation) does not possess true power. For it will exist for only six thousand years and then it will cease.[44]

Because of the condition that G-d established with it at the time of its Creation, [the world] receives greater and more encompassing strength. The fact that He created the world with the condition "that it carry out the will of the righteous even though it is against its nature" shows that although G-d created the world "for the sake of the Jewish people," that intent is an inner dimension of the world itself.

{For if the concept that the world was created "for the sake of the Jewish people" was that one entity serve another although it has no connection to it, it would not be appropriate to say that the creation was brought into being so that the world would go against its nature.}

The Jews are "the sprouting of [G-d's] planting, the work of [His] hands."[45] Therefore they are eternal, an entity of [G-d's] thought[46] which is the source and the reason (for the existence of) His speech, [the medium through which the world was brought into being]. By making "the fulfillment of the will of the righteous" [a condition] within the existence of the creation itself, G-d introduced a dimension of eternality into them which transcends their own existence.[47]

VI

On this basis, we can appreciate the interpretation offered by the Midrash to the verse: "And towards morning, the sea turned back to its power," "as per the condition established with it at the outset." While the sea was split, one could think that the miracle (changed and) nullified the sea's previous existence,[48] and thus the strength with which the fulfillment of the condition endowed the sea was not revealed.

When, however, the sea "turned back" - {and "turned back to its power," which as implied by its simple meaning is that its nature did not change (as stated in section I) and yet, its own existence left room for doing G-d's will against its nature} [a change was brought about]. Through the fulfillment of the condition, the sea attained its strength, i.e., a far greater dimension of strength than it possess by virtue of its own existence.

Adapted from Sichos Shabbos Parshas Beshallach, 5729

   

Notes:

1. (Back to text) Shmos 14:27.

2. (Back to text) Bereishis Rabbah 5:5; Shmos Rabbah 21:6; Zohar, Vol. II, p. 198b.

3. (Back to text) Baal HaTurim to the verse.

4. (Back to text) Yedei Moshe to Bereishis Rabbah, loc. cit.

5. (Back to text) Chullin 7a. See also HaYom Yom, p. 20 (referring to the statement of the Maggid of Mezeritch cited in sec. II) that the splitting of the river Ginei was a microcosm of the splitting of the Red Sea. See Chullin, ibid., which compares Rabbi Pinchas to Moshe and the 600,000 Jews.

6. (Back to text) Similar questions can be raised concerning the resolution the Or HaChayim (in his commentary to the above verse) offers to this difficulty.

7. (Back to text) HaYom Yom, loc. cit.

8. (Back to text) Berachos 35b.

9. (Back to text) [Trans. Note: G-d's word or His utterance refers to the creative power that enclothes itself within the natural order and maintains its existence. For the natural order was established through His speech at the beginning of creation. His will refers to a higher level of G-dly light which is not confined in this manner.]

10. (Back to text) See Bereishis Rabbah, loc. cit. (and the Zohar, loc. cit.) which state that "the Holy One, blessed be He, did not establish a condition with the sea alone, but with everything that was created during the six days of creation." See also the commentary of the Or HaChayim mentioned above.

11. (Back to text) This is the wording used in Or Torah, loc. cit.

12. (Back to text) The wording is borrowed from the Alter Rebbe, Tanya, Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, ch.1, (when speaking about what would happen if "the letters [of G-d's speech which brought the world into being] would withdraw, Heaven forbid, even for a moment and return to their source"). See also the following note.

13. (Back to text) It is possible to explain the above concept as follows: Even the view which accepts that the created beings could exist independently (after they were brought into being, Heaven forbid, like a utensil which exists after having been fashioned by a craftsman - the error made by those who deny G-d's existence, as stated in Tanya, Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, ch. 2) would agree that G-d could make them into "absolute nothingness and non-being."

    {When an entity is nullified through the activity of a created being, it is only the form [- and not the very core -] of the entity which is nullified. When, by contrast, G-d [nullifies an entity], even these opinions would agree that it could be nullified entirely. For it is understandable (see Moreh Nevuchim, Vol. II, ch. 17), that just as He can create something from nothing, so too, it is within His potential, to return that entity to nothingness. (This would be possible, even if the creation were, Heaven forbid, an independent entity. [For G-d would be a stronger and more powerful entity.])}

    Nevertheless, in such an instance, since - as it exists in its own right - the entity would continue to exist, and the fact that it is nullified comes from a different [and higher] power, [G-d] - it cannot be said that it would be nullified to the extent that it is "nothingness and non-being as it actually was before the six days of creation," for then it had been an entity at the outset.* [In other words, since the entity existed, and, until it was nullified, had a right to exist, its nullification would affect only its future existence.]

    By contrast, the entire being of the creation, even during the time when it does exist, [does not exist by virtue of its own power,] but comes about only as a result of the G-dly energy which brings it into being at all times. When that energy is withdrawn, its existence will be nullified as a matter of course. Thus (after the energy is withdrawn), the entity will not exist at all, in exactly the same [state of non-being as it was] before the six days of creation. (To cite a parallel: a stone that is propelled upward because of the energy [invested in it by the person who throws it]. As that energy dissipates, the stone will return to the earth as it was beforehand.**) [This said,] explanation is still necessary. See Moreh Nevuchim, Vol. I, ch. 69.

    [Trans. Note: The conceptual difficulty which the Rebbe feels has not been totally resolved is the question: How can an entity which has existed be considered as if it never existed at all? Valid distinctions can be made between the existence of the world and its non-being when compared to any other transition between states of being; still, our understanding of existence prevents us from appreciating how an object which was can cease to be entirely.]

    ---

    * A further point can be made: According to this opinion, it could be said that the world was created only for a limited time, 6000 years, and after that time it will be nullified entirely. (This shows that even during the time in which the world exists, it is not a genuine entity, see sec. V.) Nevertheless, if this entity (even though it is not genuine) would exist on its own accord (without having to be renewed continuously by the Creator), even after its existence was nullified - although that nullification would come as a matter of course, the existence of that entity would not [- in an abstract sense -] be utterly void. It could not be described as being exactly what it was before the six days of creation.

    ** Furthermore, with regard to the example of throwing a stone, it is appropriate afterwards to say that at the outset, the stone had been projected upward. In the analogue, [the existence of our world,] since time itself is a created entity (see Derech Mitzvosecho, Mitzvas HaAmanas Elokus, ch. 11, et al.), if (the utterance enclothed within [a particular creation] from) the Ten Utterances of Creation would be withdrawn, time would also cease. And thus no trace of its existence would remain at all. Further explanation is, however, still required.

14. (Back to text) It is possible to explain that the nullification of the existence of the sea, were it not to have fulfilled its condition, {and similarly, the nullification of the existence of the entire creation if the Jews would not have accepted the Torah (Shabbos 88a, Avodah Zarah 3a)} would have been greater than the nullification [of the existence of the creation] that would come about "were the letters [of the Ten Utterances] to withdraw, Heaven forbid, even for a moment" as mentioned in Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, loc. cit.

    With regard to the withdrawal of the letters, [it could be explained that] the existence of the world until the moment when the letters withdrew (could be considered an existence according to the Torah, because of the Ten Utterances through which the world was created), and its nullification affects only the future. (When, however, the existence would be nullified, it would be nullified as if it had never existed before, as explained in the previous note.) With regard to [the nullification of the existence of the sea were it not to have fulfilled its condition,] since it was brought into existence conditionally, if that condition was not fulfilled, [the existence of the sea] would have been nullified retroactively. See also note 40.

15. (Back to text) See a similar explanation which is offered in Or HaTorah, Vaes'chanan, p. 415ff.

16. (Back to text) Obviously, even according to this explanation, the verse also refers to the existence of the sea from this point onward (not only the strength endowed to its existence until its splitting). Therefore the verse mentions "to its power" after stating "and the sea returned" although the strength was endowed to its previous existence when it fulfilled its condition, and not when it "returned."

17. (Back to text) The Maharzav (in his commentary to Shmos Rabbah, loc. cit.) states that the verse should have said that the sea returned to its previous state LeKadmusoi or to its strength LeTokfo. The fact that it uses the term Le'Eisano, "to its power," leads the Midrash to interpret it as L'tnaoi is "to its condition."

    Nevertheless, as explained above, not only the choice of wording, but the very fact that the Torah adds a word that appears unnecessary is what arouses the question.

18. (Back to text) Shmos 14:21.

19. (Back to text) See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. V, pp. 175-176 and notes where this concept is explained at length.

20. (Back to text) Shmos 4:6.

21. (Back to text) Ibid.:7.

22. (Back to text) This is also reflected in our Sages' statement (Shabbos 97a) and Rashi's commentary to that verse. See also Shmos Rabbah, ch. 3:13 which states that this indicates that a positive attribute will be expressed more rapidly than an attribute of retribution.

23. (Back to text) To the extent that if there was a barrel full of water, a Jew would be able to drink water from it, but for an Egyptian, it would be blood unless he purchased the water from a Jew (Shmos Rabbah 9:10).

24. (Back to text) And thus, it was not necessary to empty the ponds, the reservoirs, and the containers in which the water which had turned into blood had been collected.

25. (Back to text) According to the explanation above, it is clear why Rashi adds the word "original," although the meaning of Le'Eisano is (only) "to its power."* For this explains the new concept brought out by the verse "the sea turned back to its power."

    ---

    * One cannot say, however, that Rashi's intent in adding the word "original" is to interpret the verse "And the sea returned to its power" because (in addition to the fact that this concept can be understood even without Rashi's commentary), Rashi cites only the word Le'Eisano as the source for his interpretation.

26. (Back to text) [To state a parallel:] In Jewish law (Sukkah 30b, Bava Kama 96b), we find the concept that "a change which will revert to its original state (even if it has not yet returned to that state) is not considered a change." And this applies even when an activity is required to return it to that state.

27. (Back to text) Shmos 14:21. This demonstrates that as Tanya, Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, ch. 2, states: "If G-d would have stopped the wind for a moment, the water would have returned and flowed downward as is its natural pattern."

    Based on what is stated above, it is understood why the Alter Rebbe found it necessary to cite the fact that G-d caused the wind to blow all night (and were He to have paused for a moment, the water would have reverted to its ordinary pattern) as proof that [the miracle was ongoing in nature]. He did not prove this from the actual fact that as soon as the wind stopped, the sea reverted to its natural state. For the returning of the sea is not indisputable proof [of the miracle's ongoing nature]. For (were it not for the concept derived from the word Le'Eisano), it is possible to say that the water's reversion to its natural state came as a result of an activity (a [second] miracle), and did not come about as a matter of course.

28. (Back to text) Tanya, Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, loc. cit.

    The wording of the Alter Rebbe communicates a new concept. On the surface, there is a difficulty. [The word Nad, rendered as "column," in our translation of the passage from Tanya,] is also found in Shmos 15:8. There the Targum, Rashi, and others interpret Nad as "a wall." Accordingly, several questions arise with regard to the Alter Rebbe's choice of wording:

    1. Seemingly, his wording is redundant, for "like a Nad, and like a wall" [share the same meaning];

    2. The letter vav, translated as "and," in the term "and like a wall," is seemingly unnecessary;

    3. Shortly afterwards, the Alter Rebbe speaks of "not standing like a wall," and does not mention "a column."

    It is possible to explain that the Alter Rebbe is emphasizing that there were two phases to the miracle. First, the waters stood like a column (a collection and accumulation of water - see Rashi's commentary; this was the only change. The water remained flowing; it was like water in a container [except that there was no container]). Afterwards, it also stood like a wall ([i.e., it hardened;] it would no longer require a container to stand erect).

    On this basis, we can appreciate the conceptual flow in Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah: Had not G-d continued the miracle, the water would have flowed again (negating the flowing column; obviously, this would lead to the negation of the following step), that it did not stand like a wall. (This is a greater change and therefore there would be no doubt concerning it.)

    The interpretation of this verse is relevant to the content of the chapter in Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah. For [it clarifies that] the miracle of the splitting of the sea follows a step-by-step sequence that recognizes that natural order, in contrast to the creation yesh meiayin, something from nothing, [which is utterly transcendent].

29. (Back to text) [This was a miracle wrought by G-d;] it was not caused by the wind itself (see the explanation of the Ramban in his commentary to Shmos 14:24). The necessity for the wind was:

    1. to leave room for the Egyptians to err, (as the Ramban writes); and

    2. because the east (Kadim) wind was the medium through which the revelation of "He who preceded the world" (Kadmono Shel Olam), the level which made possible the splitting of the sea (see the maamar entitled VaYolech Havayah 5666, and other sources).

    Nevertheless, from the explanation in Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah (and from the Rashbam and many other commentaries to the Torah), it appears that the "strong east wind" caused the actual splitting of the sea. ([Saying that the wind was unusually "strong"] resolves the question of the Ramban.)

    The Alter Rebbe uses the concept: "If G-d would have stopped the wind for a moment, the water would have returned and flowed downward as is its natural pattern" as a proof that the same motif would be applicable with regard to the creation of the heaven and earth. If G-d's creative power would withdraw from the creation, the created beings would return to nothingness [as they were before the creation]. For even if the splitting of the sea came because of the wind, the wind brought about a change in the nature of the water, causing it to stand like "a wall of stone."

    According to this, it is (simply) understood why the Alter Rebbe adds the phrases "like a wall," and "they did not stand like a wall." For from the phrase "the water would have returned and flowed downward as is its natural pattern" [would nullify] only the change that the water stood like a column (see the previous note), [and this would not serve as a proof with regard to the creation]. For the creation of the heaven and the earth made them a [new] entity, and, nevertheless, if the power of the Creator would be withdrawn, the created beings would return to absolute nothingness.

    {In that context, it is worthy to mention the debate concerning the Alter Rebbe's words "this nature in the water" (whether the intent is the [new nature] that it stood or its [established natural tendency] that it flowed downward. See the letter touching on this subject printed in Likkutei Biurim LiTanya (by R. Y. Korf). See also Likkutei Sichos, Vol. VII, p. 189, note 10.}

30. (Back to text) In Moreh Nevuchim, Vol. II, ch. 29 (see the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Avos 5:6; Rabbeinu Bachaye on the above verse), it is explained that the reason for the condition is that "the world follows its natural pattern." And it is not appropriate "that nature change after creation or that a new will be aroused after the pattern was established."

    {Firstly, the Rambam explains (Moreh Nevuchim, Vol. III, ch. 20) with regard to the concept "My thoughts are not your thoughts" (Isaiah 55:8), that even if miracles would be new developments arising at a later time, this would not be considered a change in G-d's will, Heaven forbid; see the commentary of the Tosafos Yom Tov to Avos, loc. cit. (Note the Tosafos Yom Tov's statements which explain that the Rambam's explanation - why it was necessary for G-d to establish a condition [with the created beings] - is [to explain questions others may raise] and does not reflect his own views.)}

    Moreover, in order to resolve the question that miracles appear to reflect a change in G-d's will, it would be sufficient to implant the splitting of the sea in [the masterplan for] the creation. There would be no necessity that a condition be made with regard to the creation of the sea.

31. (Back to text) Midrash Tanchuma (Buber edition), Parshas Bereishis, secs. 3,5; Rashi's commentary to Bereishis 1:1. See also Bereishis Rabbah 1:1; Vayikra Rabbah 36:4.

32. (Back to text) Mishlei 3:6.

33. (Back to text) Avos 2:12. See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. III, pp. 907, 932, for an explanation of the advantages of [the Divine service implied by] "Know Him in all your ways," over [that implied by] "All your deeds should be for the sake of heaven."

34. (Back to text) See the beginning of the series of maamarim entitled Yom Tov Shel Rosh HaShanah 5666, and other sources [where this concept is explained].

35. (Back to text) [Trans. Note - For even the G-dly power manifest in creation has limits.]

36. (Back to text) Bereishis Rabbah 5:5; see also Zohar, Vol. II, p. 198b.

37. (Back to text) See also the commentary of Tosafos Yom Tov cited above which states that the purpose of the conditions was to show that everything was created solely for the sake of the Jewish people.

38. (Back to text) See the maamar entitled HaChodesh HaZeh 5666, and other sources.

39. (Back to text) [Trans. Note: I.e., had G-d not made a condition with the creations, He still could have wrought miracles, but then the miracles would run contrary to the existence of the world. As the world exists within its own context, there would be no place for miracles. By establishing this condition, G-d enabled this dimension which by nature transcends the worlds to become an inner dimension of the world's being.

    Doing so, it changed the definition of the creation. For instead of the creation existing as an independent entity, something with an identity of its own, the creation itself took on the purpose identified with the Jewish people and the Torah. That mission became not only a fact that it was forced to accept because G-d is its Master, but the way it looked at itself, as it were.]

40. (Back to text) A question could be raised. When a person makes a conditional agreement, the statement of the condition is merely a revelation that if the condition is not fulfilled, the matter will not be concluded from the outset. With regard to the creation of heaven and earth, since they were already created, and until this moment, they actually existed, by contrast, it is seemingly difficult to understand how their existence could be nullified retroactively.

    This question is, however, not justified. For when a person establishes a condition, the condition is not merely a clarification of the matter. Instead, the nullification of the condition is the factor which causes the matter to be nullified (see Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Geirushin 8:22 and the gloss of the Maggid Mishnah).

    Similar concepts apply when "a wise man revokes a vow from the outset." The essential effect of his revocation is future-oriented, for until the time [of his revocation], the article was forbidden. Nevertheless, [theoretically,] the revocation of the wise man nullifies the vow from its inception, and it is as if the article had never been forbidden (the gloss of Rabbeinu Asher to Nedarim, 52b).

41. (Back to text) See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. V, p. 11, note 40, with regard to the transformation of the land of the gentiles to Eretz Yisrael, which emphasizes that it is important that the gentiles also agree to this. See also Toras Shalom, p. 70, and notes, which state that "The sparks from the world of Tohu should also agree [to their refinement]."

    To cite [a related matter]: The nullification of a false deity must be performed by a gentile, [not a Jew] (Avodah Zarah 52b). And [in a larger sense,] any entity that considers itself as separate, it is apart and a false divinity (Tanya, ch. 22).

42. (Back to text) For this reason, rivers which dry up once within a seven-year period* are not acceptable to be used for waters for the ashes of the parah adumah (the red heifer). For their waters are not considered as "living waters," but as "false waters" (Parah 8:9).

    ---

    * Rivers which dry up once in a longer period, by contrast, are not considered as "false waters" (Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Parah 6:12; see also the commentary of the Tosafos Yom Tov to the above Mishnah).

    This is not considered a contradiction to the concept stated above: that if an existence will cease, it is not a genuine entity. Since the entire existence of our world is "false," (for it exists only for 6000 years,) we are forced to say that the concept of "living waters" [is relative], reflecting the "life" of the creation itself. Since every seven-year cycle is an independent interval (for this reason, the commentaries explain, the land is declared ownerless once in seven years), when an entity ceases to exist over a duration of time longer than seven years, it is not considered as "false" when compared to the pattern prevalent within our world.

    (This also explains the view (espoused by Rav Ovadiah of Bartenura, Rabbeinu Shimon, and Rabbeinu Asher) that a river is not considered "false" if it ceases to flow only once in a Yovel [a 50-year cycle]. For a Yovel is considered as being "forever," as Kiddushin 15a and Rashi interpret Shmos 21:6: "He shall serve him forever."

43. (Back to text) See the Sefer HaChakirah by the Tzemach Tzedek, p. 4a, p. 104a ff., the second maamar entitled Ein Aroch 5694 (Sefer HaMaamarim 5711), sec. 30; the maamar entitled Tiku 5707, et al.

44. (Back to text) See the maamarim entitled HaUmnam Yeshav 5643, ch. 4; Kol HaShoneh Halachos 5667; Tiku 5694 (Sefer HaMaamarim 5711), et al.

    In other sources, a different explanation is offered: That the entities of the heaven and the earth are as strong today as they were on the day that they were created, and it is only because of G-d's will that they will cease to exist after the 6000 years of creation (Sefer HaChakirah 3b, 101b ff., the maamarim entitled Ein Aroch and Tiku, loc. cit.).

    [Even according to this explanation, however, there is a dimension of entropy within the creation. For] the infinite power that is invested in the creation (which endows them with eternality, that their strength will remain [constant], as on the day of their creation) is beyond their existence and does not become one with them {the maamar entitled Tzohar Taaseh 5673 (in the series of maamarim entitled BeShaah SheHikdimu 5672); see also Likkutei Sichos, Vol. V, p. 98, note 21}.

    {[The rationale is] that it is impossible that an unlimited power can enclothe itself in a limited entity, as the Rambam writes (Moreh Nevuchim, Vol. II, Introduction 12): "For every power that is found expressing itself within a body is limited, for the material entity is limited."}

    And as the entity exists in its own right (i.e., as the creations are brought into being from the Ten Utterances of Creation that enclothe themselves within them), they are breaking down, [becoming simplified], as explained in Likkutei Sichos, loc. cit.

45. (Back to text) Yeshayahu 60:21. Thus Sanhedrin 10:1 [cites this verse as the prooftext for the teaching that all Jews will receive a portion of the World to Come, the world which is eternal and not subject to the vicissitudes of time].

46. (Back to text) For "Israel arose in His thought" (Bereishis Rabbah 1:1).

47. (Back to text) The miraculous pattern of conduct [within the world] stems from the light which is Sovev Kol Almim, the light which encompasses and transcends the worlds, as stated in sec. V. Thus because of the light of Sovev Kol Almim, [it appears that] there is a dimension of eternality within the creation itself even without G-d's having established a condition with it (see note 43).

    It is possible to explain [the manner in which the condition G-d established with the world augments its existence as follows]: Since the creations were brought into being with the intent that they "carry out the will of the righteous even though it is against their nature," this intent shares a connection to the existence of the created beings themselves.

    {From one point, this dimension is more transcendent than the infinite power that maintains the constancy of the natural order, as reflected by the fact that [these miracles] bring about a disruption of the natural order (see the maamar entitled HaChodesh HaZeh, 5666). Nevertheless, since it involves a condition according to which the creation was brought into being, [it relates to the inner dimension of the creation].

    To use wording (borrowed from the Rambam, Moreh Nevuchim, loc. cit.), the power which maintains the existence of a limited creation for an unlimited time cannot enclothe itself within the creation itself. The power which makes water stand as a wall, [i.e., performs miracles,] by contrast, [relates to the inner dimension of the created being].}

48. (Back to text) See the commentary of the Or HaChayim cited above.