Likkutei Sichos, Vol. VII, p. 20ff.

I

In many years,[1] Parshas Vayikra is read on a Shabbos which is close to Purim. This leads to the conclusion that the significance and positive quality of Purim is alluded to in this Torah reading.[2]

What is the unique dimension of Purim? One of the obligations of Purim (and the obligations of the day reflect its spiritual content) is that "A person is obligated to become intoxicated on Purim to the extent that he does not know the difference between 'Cursed be Haman' and 'Blessed be Mordechai.'"[3]

The obligation to become intoxicated differs from all the other obligations of Purim in that:

1. it is the only obligation that is entirely unlimited, "to the extent that one does not know"; and

2. the intoxication which knows no limits is "(to the extent that he does not know the difference) between 'Cursed be Haman' and 'Blessed be Mordechai.'" (The fact that a person "does not know" about other matters does not indicate that he has fulfilled the mitzvah of becoming intoxicated [on Purim].)

From this, we can conclude that the obligation to become intoxicated reflects the inner and unique import of Purim which distinguishes it entirely from the other festivals.[4]

II

There is another point to be mentioned. The obligation to become intoxicated on Purim [has its source in the Megillah's description[5] of the celebrations as] "days of feasting and celebration." "Becoming intoxicated" reflects the manner in which the feast must be held.[6]

It is possible to explain that the mitzvah of "feasting and celebrating" is distinguished from all the other mitzvos ordained by our Sages to be observed on Purim in that the obligation to observe this mitzvah applies during every moment of the festival of Purim.[7] The observance of the other mitzvos of the day, by contrast, [is associated with a specific time]. For example, with regard to the mitzvah of reading the Megillah, when a person reads the Megillah once at night and once during the day, he has fulfilled the mitzvah entirely. Even with regard to the mitzvah of matanos l'evyonim, gifts to the poor, about which it states[8] that it is a mitzvah to give them profusely, there is no obligation to give them the entire day.

With regard to feasting and celebration, by contrast, since the Megillah describes the days[9] of Purim as "days of feasting and celebration" - and "feasting and celebration" is stated directly after the term yimei ("days of"), (in contrast to "sending gifts of food and gifts to the poor" which is stated afterwards), it is possible to explain that the obligation to feast and celebrate applies every moment of the day. [The fact that we do not spend the entire day "feasting and celebrating" can be explained as follows:] Through observing the mitzvah once during the day, its observance is extended[10] throughout the entire day.[11]

Since the obligation of feasting is "to become intoxicated ... to the extent that one does not know the difference between 'Cursed be Haman' and 'Blessed be Mordechai,'" it follows that this obligation applies throughout the entire day. This further expresses the concept (in addition to the points mentioned in sec. I) that the mitzvah to become intoxicated to the extent that one does not know the difference between 'Cursed be Haman' and 'Blessed be Mordechai,'" reflects the inner content of Purim, more than the other mitzvos associated with that day.

III

[The obligation to become intoxicated raises a fundamental question:] Why is it that the Torah will obligate a Jew to become intoxicated "to the extent that he does not know the difference between 'Cursed be Haman' and 'Blessed be Mordechai'"? The commentaries explain[12] that this means that a person should become intoxicated to the point that he does not know how to calculate that the Hebrew phrase ("Cursed be Haman") is numerically equivalent to the phrase ("Blessed be Mordechai").

This explanation itself raises questions:

1. Seemingly, becoming intoxicated to the point that one cannot calculate a numerical equivalent is not necessarily connected to "Cursed be Haman" and "Blessed be Mordechai." When a person is intoxicated, he is not capable of calculating any numerical equivalents,[13] even one that is much easier than that shared by "Cursed be Haman" and "Blessed be Mordechai." Why then does the Talmud cite this as the measure?

2. When the Torah cites a numerical equivalent, it is not coincidental, Heaven forbid. Instead, the numerical equivalence indicates that the two subjects share an inner connection.[14] This can be understood from the explanation in Tanya[15] that the created beings are given a name which is the numerical equivalent of certain words which are stated in the Ten Utterances of Creation. For the life-energy of every created being is drawn down from select words in these Ten Utterances. It is thus understandable that there is an connection between entities whose names share the same numerical equivalence.

A question thus arises: What is the inner connection between "Cursed be Haman" and "Blessed be Mordechai"? Seemingly, they are direct opposites.

These questions can be resolved as follows: The life-energy of every entity is the Divine intent for which that entity was created. The Divine intent in bringing Haman into being is that he [- and the situation which he brought about -] be transformed[16] into a [positive influence], i.e., that the Jews, through their Divine service should transform "Cursed be Haman" into "Blessed be Mordechai." ([This reflects a motif of greater scope,] for the intent in bringing into being all evil entities is that they be transformed into "day" and "light."[17]) Thus the Divine life-energy (and intent) for "Cursed be Haman" is "Blessed be Mordechai."[18]

This is the inner meaning of "to the extent that he does not know the difference between 'Cursed be Haman' and 'Blessed be Mordechai.'" One must transform "Cursed be Haman" into "Blessed be Mordechai," to the extent that one cannot detect the difference between them.[19] "Cursed be Haman" will have become "Blessed be Mordechai."

On a deeper level, when seeing [a situation which reflects] "Cursed be Haman," it is possible to appreciate that its intent is[20] - and indeed, that will be one's sole perception - "Blessed be Mordechai."[21]

IV

Explanation is still required: When one transforms "Cursed be Haman" into "Blessed be Mordechai," there is no real difference between them. Why then do our Sages say: "To the extent that he does not know the difference between 'Cursed be Haman' and 'Blessed be Mordechai'"? This expression implies that there is a difference between the two, but because the person is intoxicated, he is incapable of appreciating that difference.

This question can be resolved through explaining our Sages' statement:[22] "Great is teshuvah, for [the person's] intentional sins become considered as merits for him." Through teshuvah (motivated by love), the sparks of holiness found in intentional sins[23] are transformed into merits.

This reflects the advantage baalei teshuvah possess over tzaddikim, as indicated by the ruling:[24] "In the place where baalei teshuvah stand, perfect tzaddikim cannot stand." For tzaddikim can refine only the Divine sparks found in permitted entities, whose life-energy is derived from kelipas nogah. The sparks which have fallen into forbidden entities stemming from the three impure kelipos, by contrast, cannot be refined according to the Torah's directives. (On the contrary, according to the Torah, these entities must be rejected.)[25]

A baal teshuvah, by contrast, elevates also the Divine sparks that have fallen into the three impure kelipos (even the sparks which fell into intentional sin; this reflects a far lower level than the forbidden entities themselves, for intentional sin involves the violation of G-d's will[26]) and transforms them into merits.[27]

V

The reason why teshuvah has the potential to refine even the sparks that are present within intentional sins - although they are opposed to G-d's will - is because teshuvah reaches G-d's essence, the Master of the will.[28] [At this level, G-d] is not required [to express Himself in any particular way]; He is not bound [even] by His desire [for the Torah and its mitzvos].[29]

From the standpoint of G-d's essence, "I do not know which He desires, [the deeds of the righteous or the deeds of the wicked]."[30] It is only that He chose (with [absolute] free choice) to desire "the deeds of the righteous" and not to desire "the deeds of the wicked." Therefore it is not possible to say that the intentional sins will be considered significant and that they will have the power to conceal the sparks of holiness contained in them.[31]

The level of "Master of the will" which is not bound by the desire for the Torah and its mitzvos is drawn down through the Divine service of teshuvah.

The Divine service of tzaddikim, even those who have reached the level of servants of G-d with great love and pleasure [cannot relate to this peak]. For the fact that they feel pleasure in their service indicates that [their personal identity remains intact]. [G-d is Beloved,] but there is a person with an individual identity who loves [Him].[32] The person is a yesh, an entity of holiness. Therefore he is capable of drawing down only G-d's will.[33]

The Divine service of baalei teshuvah, by contrast, is characterized by bittul - they are not satisfied with their situation, and they seek to sever connections with it, "I will turn away from here."[34] Therefore they draw down the level of the Master of the will.[35]

[On this basis, we can appreciate] the meaning of "to the extent that he does not know the difference between 'Cursed be Haman' and 'Blessed be Mordechai.'"[36] The potential to transform "Cursed be Haman" to "Blessed be Mordechai" comes from the Divine service of not knowing, bittul which transcends reason and logic.

This relates to the level of G-dliness which "does not know which He desires."[37] And from that level is drawn down the potential to transform "Cursed be Haman"[38] to "Blessed be Mordechai."[39]

VI

The concept of "to the extent that one does not know" is also reflected in the apparent contrast between the beginning and the conclusion of Parshas Vayikra. The beginning of the parshah speaks about a very high level, as Rashi interprets the phrase:[40] "And He called to Moshe":

All of [G-d's] statements, declarations, and commandments were preceded by "calling," an expression of endearment.

The precedence of this "calling" is not merely chronological,[41] but also reflects a higher [spiritual] level. Calling to Moshe as an expression of endearment is a separate matter.[42] It is [not merely a preparation for] the statements, declarations, and commandments in the Torah, but instead represents a higher level than they.[43]

This is also understood from the fact that the verse states "And He called," and not "And G-d called." All the statements, declarations, and commandments state , "And G-d spoke," "And G-d said." This calling which expresses endearment, by contrast, [does not mention any name of G-d], for it comes from G-d Himself, a level which is above [all names], even the name Havayah,[44] and is not alluded to by any letter, [or point].[45]

The conclusion of the parshah,[46] by contrast, speaks about "a soul who sins," and the intent is not merely a sin committed unintentionally (as mentioned in some of the previous passages of the parshah, but a sin committed intentionally; a person who "acts treacherously against G-d,"[47] taking a false oath. And the very last words of the parshah are: "to incur guilt."

A conceptual difficulty thus arises: The name of a parshah does not reflect merely the content of the beginning of the parshah, but that of the reading in its totality,[48] including its final words.[49] On the contrary, based on the principle:[50] "The beginning is implanted in the end, and the end in the beginning," it follows that the conclusion shares a special connection to the beginning of the parshah, the calling to Moshe out of endearment. How is that sign of Divine closeness reflected in the words "to incur guilt"?

VII

This question can be resolved by prefacing the continuation of Rashi's commentary. After Rashi states that "And He called" is an expression of endearment, and that this expression preceded "all [G-d's] statements, declarations, and commandments," he states: "But to the prophets of the gentile nations, He reveals Himself using a transient and impure wording."

Questions arise: Why would one think that G-d would grant such an expression of endearment - endearment which transcends even the Torah - to the prophets of the gentile nations? Why is it necessary for Rashi to negate this supposition and explain that they were never called to in this manner?

The explanation is that precisely because [this calling reflects a transcendent level] is this possible. Were the calling to come from the same level as the Torah, it would be obviously apparent that it has no connection to the gentiles, for "He did not make known His judgments to them."[51] Indeed, a gentile who studies the Torah is liable for death.[52]

Nevertheless, since the calling stems from a higher level than the statements which follow (- a level which transcends even G-d's name Havayah,[53] as stated in sec. VI), one might think that [it could also relate to the gentile nations]. For since, from the standpoint of G-d's essence, "I do not know which He desires [the deeds of the righteous or the deeds of the wicked]," it is possible to think that G-d's call would also be addressed to the prophets of the gentile nations. Therefore Rashi clarifies that the gentile prophets were not granted such an expression of endearment. On the contrary, "He reveals Himself to them using a transient and impure wording."

For even with regard to the level concerning which it is said:[54] "Is not Esav Yaakov's brother?" i.e., the two are equal in His eyes, it is nevertheless said, "I love Yaakov and I hate Esav."[55]

This also explains the connection between the beginning of the parshah and its conclusion, for "The beginning is implanted in the end, and the end in the beginning." [Although the passage concludes:] "To incur guilt," [the intent is that] the intentional sins be transformed into merits, [as that verse states:] "[And the priest] shall provide atonement ... and it shall be forgiven." For the ultimate concept of atonement and forgiveness comes through the transformation of the sins into merits.

This is an [appropriate] conclusion for the passage which begins "And He called," using an expression of endearment. For [the transformation of sin into merit] expresses the true endearment that G-d shows the Jewish people - how they stand above the Torah itself, as it were. Because of this love, even when a Jew transgresses one of the Torah's commandments, and performs a deed appropriate for Esav, [G-d] "love[s] Yaakov," [the G-dly spark] in that Jew and [grants] him [the potential for] atonement and forgiveness for his sins, indeed, allowing even the transformation of the sins to merits.

VIII

This common factor - the transformation of darkness into light - which is shared by Parshas Vayikra and Purim, is alluded to in the verse:[56] Lo tashbis melech..., "Do not refrain [from placing] the salt of your G-d's covenant."

The maamar beginning with this verse in Likkutei Torah[57] states that salt is referred to as , "the salt of your G-d's covenant," because there are 120 forms of the letters of G-d's name .[58] From them, 120 permutations in the realm of kelipas nogah derive their nurture. Twice 120 - the forms of and their permutations in nogah - equals 240, , "bitter." This is also the numerical equivalent of Amalek .

Salt is thus called "the covenant of ," for it transforms the severe judgments and bitterness which stems from G-d's name into sweetness.

IX

Based on the above, we can appreciate a wondrous insight stemming from the maamar in Likkutei Torah mentioned in the previous section. The maamar states[59] that the Torah is G-d's wisdom "in which is enclothed the Or Ein Sof itself." To this, the Tzemach Tzedek adds a parenthetic statement:

Therefore the Torah is called , "the primordial analogy," for it is a medium for Or Ein Sof, , the Primordial One of eternity,"[60] as explained in the maamar of Purim.

[The Tzemach Tzedek's statement] requires explanation:

1. An analogy combines two contrasts. On one hand, it is a medium for the analogue, and the analogue is enclothed in it; [i.e., from the analogy, one can appreciate and grasp the analogue]. On the other hand, the analogy is not the analogue; it is another entity. Indeed, it conceals the analogue. As Torah Or, (in the maamar of Purim which the Tzemach Tzedek cites,[61]) states:[62] "It is not the substance of the analogue," and "It conceals the analogue."[63] Thus, explanation is required: the maamar in Likkutei Torah speaks of the advantage the Torah possesses, that "in [it] is enclothed the Or Ein Sof itself." What does [the Tzemach Tzedek] add by stating that the Torah is called the "primordial analogy"? On the contrary, this indicates that [since the Torah is] an analogy, it conceals the analogue, "the Primordial One of eternity."

2. Generally, when a maamar is cited in Chassidus (by the Tzemach Tzedek as well), it is referred to by its opening words. Thus [the Tzemach Tzedek] should have said, "as explained in the maamar entitled Chayiv Inish Livisumei." Why does he use the expression "the maamar of Purim"?

These questions can be resolved as follows: By stating that the Torah is called the "primordial analogy," and by citing "the maamar of Purim," the Tzemach Tzedek alludes to a concept associated with the transformation of darkness into light. This is the theme of the maamar entitled Lo Tashbis Melech.

X

As mentioned above, an analogy conceals the analogue. From a certain perspective, it can be said that the concealment of an analogy is more comprehensive than that of a riddle. For the riddle is obviously a matter that in and of itself - without its solution - does not make sense. Indeed, it may contradict logic, for example, Shimshon's riddle:[64] "From the brash will emerge sweetness." This indicates that the riddle alludes to a concept that is invested in it. In contrast, an analogy itself has a certain degree of intellectual content, and the possibility exists that a person will not appreciate that it is a medium[65] for the analogue.[66]

(In certain sources, it is explained that an analogy conceals the analogue less than a riddle conceals its solution. This applies when a person knows that the analogy [is an analogy, and appreciates that] there is an analogue. In such an instance, it is far easier to appreciate the analogue of an analogy than the solution of a riddle. It is, however, possible when looking at an analogy to think that it is self-contained and does not allude to an analogue. From this perspective, the analogy causes more concealment than a riddle.)

It is possible to explain that this is the Tzemach Tzedek's intent in writing that the Torah is called: "'the primordial analogy,' for it is a medium for Or Ein Sof," implying that the concealment of the analogy has to be transformed into a "medium" [for revelation].

For this reason, the Tzemach Tzedek refers to the source as "the maamar of Purim."[67] For the theme of Purim is - as stated in secs. III and V - the transformation of "Cursed be Haman" to "Blessed be Mordechai." And this alludes to [the transformation that is necessary with regard to this study].

XI

As explained previously (sec. III ff.), the obligation to "become intoxicated on Purim to the extent that one does not know the difference between 'Cursed be Haman' and 'Blessed be Mordechai'" {which, as stated in sec. II, applies every moment of Purim and expresses the theme of the holiday} contains two dimensions:

1. that "Cursed be Haman" must be transformed into "Blessed be Mordechai"; [and]

2. this transformation is accomplished through the Divine service of "not knowing" (the bittul which transcends intellect).

Since both of these concepts express the fundamental theme of Purim, we can understand that by referring to the maamar as "the maamar of Purim," the Tzemach Tzedek had in mind the Divine service of "not knowing."

The beginning of the section of the maamar in Likkutei Torah (to which the Tzemach Tzedek adds the parenthetic remark concerning "the primordial analogy") focuses on the concept of mesirus nefesh, explaining that it has its root in "the essence of the soul which transcends intellect." Accordingly, it is possible to say that the Tzemach Tzedek's note relates (not only to the words which immediately precede it, that the Or Ein Sof itself is actually enclothed in the Torah), but to the beginning of the section which speaks about the concept of mesirus nefesh.

For the two concepts - mesirus nefesh and "the primordial analogy" - are interrelated. Mesirus nefesh stems from "the essence of the soul that transcends intellect that is butel to the essence of Or Ein Sof which utterly transcends wisdom," i.e., the dimension of "not knowing" within man. This level [within man] relates to the level [within G-dliness] concerning which it is said: "I do not know which He desires...." This generates the potential for - and is expressed through - the Divine service of "the primordial analogy," making the analogy a medium for "the Primordial One."[68]

This is alluded to by the Tzemach Tzedek through the reference to "the maamar of Purim." For this reflects two concepts: the Divine service of transforming "Cursed be Haman" to "Blessed be Mordechai," and also the factor that generates the potential for this transformation, the Divine service of "not knowing" which is mentioned at the beginning of the section.

XII

This reflects (as is obvious from other sources) how all concepts in Chassidus, even those which are seemingly parenthetic, are precise and refer to wondrous concepts. Even the verses (or quotes from our Sages) with which the maamarim begin, (and even the parshiyos when the maamarim were recited or with regard to which they are printed in the texts of Chassidus) share an inner connection to the concepts which are discussed in the maamarim.[69] As explained above, the concept of "the primordial analogy" shares a connection to the concept "Do not refrain [from placing] the salt" (with which the maamar begins) and to Parshas Vayikra (where the maamar is printed). And as explained above, "salt" and vayikra reflect the concept of the transformation of darkness to light which stems from the Divine service which transcends knowledge and understanding.

This shows us the extent to which we must focus and probe when studying the teachings of our Rebbeim, including even those matters which on the surface appear to have been cited incidentally. As our Sages[70] comment on the verse:[71] "It is not an empty matter for you": "[If you perceive it] as empty, the emptiness stems from you,... because you are not laboring in Torah study." For even these [seemingly] incidental matters are very precise, contain significant lessons, and allude to wondrous matters.

(Adapted from Sichos Shabbos Parshas Vayikra, 5725)

   

Notes:

1. (Back to text) [I.e., whenever there is a leap year.]

2. (Back to text) See the Shaloh, Chelek Torah Shebichsav, Parshas Vayeishev. (See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. V, p. 129, note 1, where this passage is quoted and discussed.)

3. (Back to text) Megillah 7:2. There is a slight difference between the wording of the Aramaic in the original and the manner in which the phrase is quoted in Chassidus. [The version quoted in Chassidus is, however,] found in the notes of the Maor HaKatan to the Halachos of Rabbeinu Yitzchak Alfasi, the conclusion of Shaar HaKavannos, the Shaloh, Parshas Tetzaveh. This version is found in all texts of Chassidus. It is also found in the Orchos Chayim (quoted in the Beis Yosef, ch. 695), the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 695:2), and the Siddur Yaabetz.

4. (Back to text) The other mitzvos associated with Purim are [also] particularly connected with Purim and reflect its theme (as the mitzvos associated with any festival reflect its theme). Nevertheless, because they are limited, they have a certain connection to the other festivals. The obligation to become intoxicated "to the extent that one does not know...," since it is unlimited, reflects an inner, essential dimension incomparably greater than any measured quality (even than those associated with Purim) and is entirely different than all other festivals and holidays.

5. (Back to text) Esther 9:23.

6. (Back to text) In this vein, note the Rambam's statements (Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Megillah 2:15): "What are the obligations of this feast (i.e., the feast required because Purim is a day of 'feasting and celebration' as mentioned in the previous halachah)? A person should drink wine until he becomes intoxicated...."

7. (Back to text) Although the time for the Purim feast is during the day, in the afternoon (Rama, Orach Chayim 695:2), [the obligation to become intoxicated applies throughout the day, for that obligation is more encompassing].

8. (Back to text) Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Megillah 2:17.

9. (Back to text) [I.e., Purim and Shushan Purim.]

10. (Back to text) We see a parallel with regard to the mitzvah of taking the four species [on the holiday of Sukkos]. [There is] one opinion (Sukkah 46b) which states that the lulav and esrog are set aside for the entire day (because they are to be used for the mitzvah, they cannot be used for any mundane purpose). [According to this view, it can be explained] that taking the lulav and the esrog once throughout the day causes the mitzvah to be extended throughout the day. (See Tzofnas Pane'ach, Kuntres Hashlamah, p. 6.)

11. (Back to text) The prohibition against fasting [on Purim and Shushan Purim] - which is also derived from the phrase "days of feasting and celebration" - that applies during the entire day is not relevant to the matter at hand. For fasting is the direct opposite of and indeed, contradicts happiness.

12. (Back to text) Agudah, cited in the Darchei Moshe and the Bayis Chadash in the commentaries to the Tur, Orach Chayim 695, and the Magen Avraham 695:3.

13. (Back to text) [We see that when a person becomes intoxicated, he loses control entirely,] as reflected in our Sages' statements (Megillah, loc. cit.) that when he became intoxicated on Purim, Rabbah slew Rav Zeira.

14. (Back to text) See Shomer Emunim, Debate I, chs. 21-23.

15. (Back to text) Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, chs. 1 and 7.

16. (Back to text) Cf. Esther 9:1.

17. (Back to text) See Tanya, ch. 27, which interprets Mishlei 16:14 [which speaks of "a wicked man" being made] "for an evil day," [as implying that the purpose for the wicked man's creation is that he transform his evil into day and light].

18. (Back to text) Nevertheless, since the Divine life-energy in "Cursed be Haman" which is drawn down from "Blessed be Mordechai" is in an ultimate state of concealment, the relationship between the two terms is therefore expressed through gematria. For this indicates a very small quantity of life-energy (Tanya, Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, loc. cit.). See also Likkutei Sichos, Vol. V, p. 347, sec. XV, with regard to the concept "bakol."

19. (Back to text) [To cite a parallel:] According to one opinion, at the Giving of the Torah, the Jews responded "Yes" to both the positive and negative commandments (Mechilta, Shmos 20:1), [i.e., they saw in the negative commandments an opportunity for the positive affirmation of G-d's will]. See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. VI, p. 124ff.

20. (Back to text) On this basis, we can appreciate the obligation instituted by our Sages (Berachos 60b) to bless G-d for the apparently evil, just as one blesses Him for the good, accepting everything with happiness. This is an obligation required by the Torah of truth, implying that one's happiness must be genuine, as one is happy when receiving apparent good. See Tanya, ch. 26.

21. (Back to text) According to this explanation, we can appreciate the wording chosen by our Sages: "to the extent that he does not know the difference between 'Cursed be Haman' and 'Blessed be Mordechai.'" This implies that a person cannot distinguish between them. According to the interpretation that the person cannot calculate that the terms share a numerical equivalent, by contrast, what the person does not appreciate is not their difference, but their similarity.

22. (Back to text) Yoma 86b.

23. (Back to text) [These sparks of holiness] can themselves be referred to as "intentional sins." For the Divine spark "has become so distanced and darkened until it itself is like evil," to cite a parallel [in the laws of kashrus,] the principle chatichah naaseh neveilah (the maamar entitled Padeh BiShalom, 5675, quoted in Kitzurim LiTanya, p. 143; Sefer HaMaamarim 5665, p. 104).

    [The intent is that in certain circumstances, when a kosher piece of food comes in contact with a non-kosher substance, not only does that food itself become forbidden, it is considered as a forbidden substance and causes other substances to become forbidden. Similarly, in the spiritual parallel, not only are the intentional sins forbidden, they cause the sparks themselves to be considered as forbidden.]

    [Although a baal teshuvah can elevate these sparks of G-dliness. He] cannot elevate the sins themselves, Heaven forbid. [On the contrary, they are against G-d's will and cannot become an element of holiness.] (See the maamar entitled Ner Chanukah, 5670; see also note 31.)

24. (Back to text) [Although there are two different opinions mentioned in] Berachos 34b, in many texts of Chassidus, this view - the opinion of Rabbi Abahu - is cited without contention. It is also quoted by the Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Teshuvah 7:4. See the maamar entitled Padeh BiSholom, 5709, note 1 (Sefer HaMaamarim 5709, p. 183).

25. (Back to text) See Likkutei Torah, Shir HaShirim, p. 6d.

26. (Back to text) See Tanya, ch. 24, [which explains that a person who violates G-d's will is on a lower level than the forbidden entities themselves. For these entities are fulfilling the purpose for which they were created - to provide man with a challenge - while a person who sins, is not fulfilling his purpose.]

27. (Back to text) See the elaboration on these concepts in Derech Mitzvosecha, p. 191a.

28. (Back to text) See the conclusion of the maamar entitled Tiku, 5691, et al.

29. (Back to text) [Hence, even though one has transgressed His will, that transgression can be corrected.]

    See the maamar entitled Shuvah, 5671, which states: "The source for the potential for teshuvah is because the essence of Or Ein Sof is not, heaven forbid, limited in His will. Although the desire for the mitzvos stems from the inner dimension and the essence of Or Ein Sof, He is not limited or compelled by [His] will, heaven forbid."

    [Trans. Note: The intent is that as G-d's will is expressed, there is a distinction between good and evil, what He desires and what He does not desire. This distinction is, however, entirely dependent on His will. Within the mortal sphere, because an article is good, we desire it; if it is not good, we do not desire it. Within the spiritual sphere, there is no entity that has an independent existence. Therefore, it is G-d's desire for an entity that it causes it to become good. And the fact that He does not desire an entity causes it to become the opposite of good.

    G-d Himself, however, is not dependent on His will. Therefore, even after He has deemed an entity as undesirable, that entity does not cause complete concealment which would prevent the G-dly sparks within that entity from relating to Him.]

30. (Back to text) Bereishis Rabbah, the conclusion of ch. 2. See Likkutei Torah, Vayikra, p. 7d.

31. (Back to text) One cannot say that because G-d is not bound by His will, it is possible that the intentional sins themselves [- in contrast to the G-dly sparks within them -] could be transformed into merits. For the mitzvos relate to G-d's essence. As the maamar entitled Shuvah 5671 explains, within the inner dimension and the essence of Or Ein Sof (the source for the potential for teshuvah), there also exists the desire for the mitzvos. [Trans. Note: Although G-d's essential infinity makes it possible for the sparks of G-dliness present within evil to be elevated, it is only the sparks which are elevated, not the evil itself.]

    (This is also reflected in Bereishis Rabbah, loc. cit. From the same level concerning which it states: "I do not know which He desires," [emanates] the desire for the deeds of the righteous and the lack of the desire for the deeds of the wicked.)

    {On the contrary, since G-d's essence is not confined to His will, and the negation of evil stems from His [free] choice, that choice nullifies and rejects evil absolutely, to a greater extent than it is negated by the revealed levels of G-dliness. See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. IV, p. 1341.}

    [Trans. Note: From the perspective of the revealed levels of G-dliness, although evil is not desired, one might find some redeeming virtues within it. From the standpoint of His essence, since it is rejected, the rejection is complete.]

32. (Back to text) See Tanya, chs. 35, 37; Torah Or, p. 114a.

33. (Back to text) [Trans. Note: For every entity which is conscious of its existence relates to the levels of G-dliness that have descended and confined themselves in a framework that relates to limited existence.]

34. (Back to text) Cf. Rashi, Shmos 3:3. This reflects the motif of teshuvah {as indicated by the teaching of the Baal Shem Tov on the verse (Ibid.: 2): "And the angel of G-d appeared to him" (printed in Sefer HaSichos 5702, p. 46)}. ([See] the beginning of the maamar entitled Min HaMeitzar, 5705.)

35. (Back to text) See similar concepts in ch. 7 of the maamar entitled Tiku cited above.

    [Trans. Note: A baal teshuvah seeks to transcend his personal existence. This thrust opens him up to the potential for ultimate self-transcendence, and enables Him to relate to the aspects of G-dliness that are similarly unbounded.]

36. (Back to text) See similar concepts explained in Torah Or, p. 99d (and in the marginal notes to Likkutei Sichos, Vol. VII, p. 27; note 67 of this sichah) and the maamar entitled Amar Rabbah Chayiv Inish, 5708, ch. 10.

37. (Back to text) [I.e., a love of G-dliness which is also above the limits of reason and logic.]

38. (Back to text) I.e., the Divine sparks contained within Haman, but not Haman himself, as stated in notes 23 and 31. This is also indicated in our Sages' expression, for they speak of "to the extent that he does not know the difference between 'Cursed be Haman' and 'Blessed be Mordechai.'" This implies that even "not know[ing]" has a limit, "to the extent." (See similar concepts explained in the maamar entitled Amar Rabbah Chayiv Inish, cited above.)

39. (Back to text) See similar concepts explained in the conclusion of the series of maamarim of Rosh HaShanah, 5695, and the maamar entitled HaYom Haras Olam, 5713, which state that the potential to transform darkness to light stems from G-d's essential potential, the level which possesses both the capacity to reveal itself and the capacity not to reveal itself, and combines both capacities in a single thrust. It is through the revelation of this level that the darkness can be transformed to light.

40. (Back to text) Vayikra 1:1.

41. (Back to text) There are other reasons for calling, as Yoma 4b states: "A person should not tell something to a colleague unless he calls him." In that instance, however, calling is not an expression of endearment, but instead serves [to capture the person's attention]. Such a calling is merely a preparation for the statement that follows and is on a lower level than it.

42. (Back to text) On this basis, we can also understand the [next] entry in Rashi's commentary:

    Is it possible there was also a calling for the pauses? [The Torah continues]: "And [G-d] spoke...." The calling was for the statements, and not for the pauses.

    What purpose did the pauses serve? They provided Moshe with an opportunity to contemplate between one passage and another.

    One might ask: What import does knowing the purpose of the pauses have for our comprehension of the verse at hand?

    In resolution, the following concept can be stated: [As mentioned above,] calling for the purpose of endearment is a separate matter that is not directly related to [G-d's] speaking. {The calling came before [G-d's] speech, only because it is not ordinary and common to call someone without speaking to him.} Hence, one might think (were it not for the concept taught by "And G-d spoke," which shows that the calling was for the purpose of speech and not for the pauses) that G-d would also call to Moshe for the pauses. For this would also express His endearment of the Jewish people. For it would be evident that the purpose of the pauses was to allow further calling, i.e., additional expressions of endearment. Once, however, the verse "And G-d spoke," teaches that the calling was not for the pauses, Rashi then feels the need to resolve the question: "What was the purpose of the pauses?" Hence, he states: "They provided...."

    (The reason why this explanation was written in a second entry - and not in the first entry which explains that calling is an expression of endearment - although the question raised depends on the concept stated in the first entry, is clarified in Sichos Shabbos Parshas Vayikra, 5725.)

43. (Back to text) See Avos 3:14: "Beloved are the people Israel, for a precious article was given to them." [The "precious article" refers to the Torah. Before mentioning these "precious article," the mishnah states that: "Beloved are the people Israel."]

44. (Back to text) See Zohar, Vol. I, p. 102b; Likkutei Torah, the beginning of Parshas Vayikra.

45. (Back to text) Likkutei Torah, Bamidbar, p. 80b; Zohar, Vol. III, p. 257b; see also note 53.

46. (Back to text) Vayikra 5:21.

47. (Back to text) Ibid.

48. (Back to text) There is a straightforward proof of this concept: Parshas Noach begins eleh toldos Noach, while Parshas Toldos begins vi'eleh toldos Yitzchak. Nevertheless, the first reading is called Noach, and the second, Toldos. On the surface, if a parshah's name depended on its first words, Noach should have been called Toldos (for the word Toldos precedes Noach) and it is the first example of a reading that begins Eleh toldos. The second reading which begins Vieleh toldos Yitzchak should, by contrast, have been called Yitzchak to differentiate it from Toldos (Noach).

    In practice, however, we find that the first reading is called Noach, and the second, Toldos, because these names reflect the thematic content of the Torah readings as explained in other sources.

49. (Back to text) For they are all elements of Parshas Vayikra and referred to by that name. See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. V, p. 337ff.

50. (Back to text) Sefer Yetzirah 1:7.

51. (Back to text) Psalms 147:19.

52. (Back to text) Sanhedrin 59a.

53. (Back to text) Note the statements of Likkutei Torah, Vayikra, p. 26 b-c, which explain that the observance of the Torah and its mitzvos draws down influence from G-d's name Havayah. Teshuvah (which, as stated in sec. V, reaches the level "I don't know") draws down influence from the level of "the Rock," which is above the name Havayah.

    See also Torah Or, the maamar entitled Chayiv Inish, p. 100b, which explains that the reason the name Havayah is not mentioned in the Megillah is that "On Purim, through their mesirus nefesh ("self-sacrifice"), they reached the essence of Ein Sof which transcends the name Havayah.

54. (Back to text) Malachi 1:2-3, explained in Torah Or, p. 120c; Likkutei Torah LiGimmel Parshiyos, p. 37a ff.; Or HaTorah, Bereishis, Vol. III, p. 565a ff.; et al.

55. (Back to text) [Trans. Note: Within the limits of our existence, everything has a specific value; it is either good or bad, light or darkness. At the transcendent level described in the sichah, there is no reason for good, nor does darkness bring about concealment. For He is above all reason, and darkness and light are equal before Him. Nevertheless, He chooses Yaakov - i.e., invests the very essence of His being in the Jewish people and the Torah and its mitzvos.]

56. (Back to text) Vayikra 2:13.

57. (Back to text) Vayikra, p. 6c.

58. (Back to text) [Trans. Note: There are five letters in this name. Thus there are 120 (5x4x3x2x1) forms in which these letters can be rearranged.]

59. (Back to text) Sec. II of that maamar, p. 4c of Likkutei Torah.

60. (Back to text) [Trans. Note: Kadmon, "primordial," is used to described G-d. For He is the only entity to whom that term can genuinely be applied. There was a point in time - or in the realms of existence which precede time - at which every other entity did not exist. G-d, by contrast, always was. There is no point at which He came into being.]

61. (Back to text) The second maamar entitled Chayiv Inish.

62. (Back to text) Torah Or, p. 98b.

63. (Back to text) Ibid.:c.

64. (Back to text) Shoftim 14:14.

65. (Back to text) [Trans. Note: For example, Shir HaShirim is not an ordinary love poem, but an analogy for the relationship between G-d and the Jewish people. Nevertheless, there are many - indeed, so many that our Sages (see Midrash Tanchuma, Parshas Tetzaveh, sec. 1, et. al.) felt the need to counsel against such an attitude - who understand it according to its simple meaning.]

66. (Back to text) It must be noted that the concept mentioned in Likkutei Torah, that "The Torah is G-d's wisdom [in which is enclothed Or Ein Sof itself]" {to which the Tzemach Tzedek adds the parenthetic statement:

    "Therefore the Torah is called , 'the primordial analogy,'"} comes as an introduction to the concept explained further on (in sec. IV of the maamar) which explains the advantage of studying Nigleh, the external, legal dimension of the Torah and not the stories in the Written Law and the Aggadah.

    The halachos, Torah law, (like an analogy,) are enclothed in intellect, it is possible to err [and think] that the external dimension is all they contain; they are only "the body of the Torah." As the Zohar (Vol. III, p. 152a) states: "The importance of the body is the soul. In this manner, the Torah has a body, the body of Torah law.... The soul, it is the essence of the entire Torah itself."

    The stories [from the Written Law] and the Aggadah, by contrast, are like riddles. Since they are not enclothed in directives (and the very name Torah relates to the word hora'ah, "directive"), they clearly refer to mystic Torah secrets, that like riddles, are larger than themselves.

    This is implied by the Tzemach Tzedek's description of the Torah as "the primordial analogy" and saying that "it is a medium for Or Ein Sof." For through the study of P'nimiyus HaTorah (which is called "salt"), the analogy (the study of Nigleh) may become a medium for Or Ein Sof as explained further on (like salt that prepares meat). See Kuntres Etz Chayim, ch. 12ff., which explains similar concepts.

67. (Back to text) It must be noted that "the maamar of Purim" to which the Tzemach Tzedek refers in Likkutei Torah begins with the teaching Chayiv inish livisumei... "A person is obligated to become intoxicated on Purim to the extent that he does not know the difference...."* It is possible to explain that this maamar is referred to as "the maamar of Purim," although there are several other maamarim explaining the concepts of Purim [in Torah Or], for this mitzvah expresses the fundamental theme of Purim.

    Although the intent of referring to the maamar as "the maamar of Purim" is to refer to the service of not knowing [and the transformation it brings about], the Tzemach Tzedek does not refer to the maamar by its opening words Chayiv inish [- as is the ordinary pattern]. For then one might understand that this is a reference like others without appreciating the allusion intended. One might not realize that his intent was not to mention merely the maamar which begins with these words, rather than the theme they convey. Hence he refers to the maamar as "the maamar of Purim."

    ---

    * It must be noted that in this maamar (p. 99d), it is explained that the explanation of "to the extent that one does not know" is to reach mesirus nefesh that transcends the bounds of intellect. (See sec. XI which explains that the Tzemach Tzedek's intent in citing "the maamar of Purim" was to allude to this level of "not knowing.") This Divine service reaches the essence of Or Ein Sof with regard to which everything [- light and darkness -] is equal.

68. (Back to text) [Trans. Note: Mesirus nefesh makes it possible for the mediums of expression within the analogy to be perceived, not as elements of concealment, but as instruments for revelation.]

69. (Back to text) See the maamar entitled Ukisavtem, 5729, which explains why the maamar of this title from 5629 was recited in Parshas Eikev, although the verse Ukisavtem is also stated in the preceding parshah, Parshas Vaes'chanan, because the content of the maamar is relevant to Parshas Eikev.

70. (Back to text) Jerusalem Talmud, Pe'ah 1:1.

71. (Back to text) Devarim 32:47.