1. The Problematic Prohibition of Interest.

This[433] week's Torah reading spells out the prohibition[434] of giving (and taking)[435] interest. It concludes as follows:[436] "I am the L-rd your G-d Who brought you out of the land of Egypt... to be your G-d." On this the Sifra comments: "From this verse the Sages concluded that whoever accepts the prohibition[437] of interest accepts the yoke of heaven, and whoever casts off the prohibition of interest casts off the yoke of heaven..., for whoever accepts the commandment concerning interest believes in the Exodus from Egypt, and whoever denies the commandment concerning interest in effect denies the Exodus from Egypt."

This demands explanation. Why should the prohibition of interest be more particularly related than other commandments to the Exodus and to one's acceptance of the yoke of heaven?

Explaining the relation between interest and the Exodus, Rashi (based on the Gemara[438]) quotes the above verse425 ("I am the L-rd your G-d Who brought you out of the land of Egypt") and adds to it as follows: "...and just as I differentiated between those who were firstborn and those who were not, so do I know -- and punish -- a person who lends money to a fellow Jew on interest and says that it belongs to a gentile [and is therefore exempt of the restrictions on interest]."

However, this statement explains the connection between interest and the Exodus only in the particular case in which a lender on interest claims that the money belongs to a gentile. Even in that case, this explanation is not applicable when the reason for this claim is that if the borrower knew that the money really belonged to a Jew he would not want to borrow it,424 or the Rabbinical court would not allow such a loan to take place. Only if the lender making this claim believed that G-d did not perceive that the money in fact belonged to him, would such a claim constitute a denial of the Exodus when G-d did differentiate, and so on. Thus we are still left without an explanation as to the relation between the prohibition on interest as a whole, and the Exodus.

Besides, we still need to understand the connection between the prohibition on interest and one's acceptance of the yoke of heaven.

There are those[439] who explain the connection as follows. When one Jew gives another an interest-free loan, with no thought of gain, he thereby demonstrates his trust[440] in G-d and his acceptance of the yoke of heaven, as exemplified in the command to help a fellow Jew without any thought of gain; an individual who lends on interest, by contrast, demonstrates that he does not put his trust in G-d, and that he has cast off the yoke of heaven.

This explanation, however, remains problematic for two reasons:

1. The above train of thought is not an index of that individual's acceptance of the yoke of heaven, but of the measure of his trust [in G-d's providence].

2. His lack of trust is not connected to the question of interest, but rather to the obligation to practice kindly deeds.[441] Immediately before the prohibition of interest the Torah commands:[442] "If your brother grows poor... you shall come to his aid," by lending him money without interest. Now if some individual, anxious for his livelihood, does not want to lend money without interest, but prefers instead to invest every cent of his profitably, it is true that he thereby demonstrates his lack of trust -- but he does not thereby transgress the prohibition of exacting interest (since he never lent in the first place).

2. Who is Steering Whom?

The acceptance of the yoke of heaven -- which finds expression in the fulfillment of the commandments -- is basically G-d's participation in the avodah of the Jewish people.

Speaking of the blessings that are pronounced over the mitzvos[443] just before their performance,[444] Chassidus explains[445] that the phrase "Who has sanctified us with His commandments" stresses that these are G-d's commandments, for He too fulfills them.[446]

G-d's fulfillment of the mitzvos takes two forms:[447]

1. The Divine fulfillment of the commandments that precedes the Jewish people's fulfillment of the commandments, in the spirit of the teaching of the Sages that[448] "What He does He commands Israel to do";

2. The Divine fulfillment of the commandments that is generated by the Jewish people's fulfillment of the commandments, in the spirit of the teaching of the Sages that[449] "Whoever reads the Torah, the Holy One, Blessed be He, reads and repeats in step with him." And what is said here of Torah study, is equally true of the observance of mitzvos.

It goes without saying that the fact that the Divine fulfillment of the commandments is generated by the Jewish people's fulfillment of the commandments, is not due to any proportionate relation between them, for a created being is in no sense comparable to the Creator; it is only that the Divine Will so chose -- that the commandments observed by the Jewish people should (so to speak) produce such an effect above.

This requires understanding: What reason underlies this choice of the Divine Will -- that the avodah of the Jewish people down here in this world should (so to speak) exert an influence above, despite the fact that the distance between these two poles is infinitely incomparable?

There is no problem in understanding the reverse direction -- the Divine observance of the commandments that precedes their observance below -- because as a result of437 "what He does" he empowers "Israel to do": He enables the Jewish people to observe the commandments.[450] What remains to be understood is, how does one explain the fact that the actions of the Jewish people here below should cause the same actions to be undertaken above?

3. Rewards Honestly Earned.

The solution emerges from an understanding of the essential nature of avodah.

For a start, a basic question begs to be answered: Why should the world order necessitate the Jewish people's avodah? After all, G-d could have granted every kind of benevolent influence[451] on His own heavenly initiative,[452] especially since the Divine intent underlying all of Creation was[453] "to act benevolently toward his creatures." For G-d is the ultimate good, and[454] "it is the nature of the benevolent to do good." Accordingly, should not all created beings receive every kind of downflow of Divine benevolence440 even without avodah? And if this is true of all created beings, surely it should apply to the Jewish people, the nucleus and purpose of Creation, which was initiated[455] "for the sake of the Jewish people and the Torah, both of which are called 'the beginning.' "

In response, Chassidus explains that a downflow of Divine benevolence constitutes true good only when it is earned. A gift dispensed gratis, without any exertion on the part of the recipient, is called[456] "the bread of disgrace." And since443 "it is the nature of the benevolent to do good," G-d desires to give His people that which is true good. Accordingly, He ordained that they should receive their Divinely-bestowed benefits only as a result of avodah.

This understanding now enables us to appreciate why the avodah of the Jewish people creates (as it were) repercussions in the worlds above.

When a man receives a reward (i.e., hashpaah, benevolent influence from above) in exchange for a certain task of divine service (and not as an unearned gift), but this act of divine service is of no real value to the payer (i.e., the mashpia or bestower of the benevolence), then such a reward is still definable as "the bread of disgrace," since the recipient knows that the labors which earned it are of no real value and therefore undeserving of reward.

This is why G-d ordained a world order whereby the avodah of the Jewish people produces an effect above (viz., the Divine fulfillment of the same mitzvos which have been fulfilled below). In this way, the reward for this divine service can in no sense be termed "the bread of disgrace": since their avodah serves a useful purpose above, the Jewish people are entitled to be rewarded for it.[457]

4. Productive Labor.

There is an additional explanation as to why the actions of the Jewish people here below should cause the same actions to be duplicated above.

Work which is of no intrinsic use -- even if paid for -- is done without vitality or pleasure, so that it becomes burdensome and tiring, "backbreaking toil."[458]

(My revered father-in-law, the Rebbe [Rayatz], used to explain this[459] by telling of a squire who ordered a peasant to bring a sickle to his room and to pretend to harvest there in thin air. Though the peasant agreed to do so in exchange for the payment that was promised, soon enough he begged to be relieved of his work, because "I've got nothing to show for it.")

This is why G-d ordained that a Jew's labors produce an effect above, and a knowledge of this infuses those labors with vitality and delight. This knowledge also gives a Jew the strength[460] to withstand the Evil Inclination,[461] which argues (for example), "What difference does it make to G-d whether or not you put on tefillin, or whether or not you invest time in davenen with measured deliberation?" The Jew has the strength to withstand such arguments when he senses that his divine service affects (as it were) the very Essence and Being of G-d.[462]

5. Taking G-d as a Partner.

All the benevolence that is drawn down to this world results from the avodah of the Jewish people. Hence, just as in relation to the particular flow of benevolence elicited from above by each individual mitzvah, the fulfillment of the mitzvah above is activated by the fulfillment of the same mitzvah below, so too in relation to the scheme at large: In order that the universal avodah of the Jewish people should produce its effect above, a specific kind of avodah is called for. This specific avodah is -- the observance of the mitzvah concerning interest.

Receiving interest means receiving profit for money lent, i.e., receiving profit from the fact that in the past the money was the lender's (though it has since passed into the possession of the borrower); and by having (in the past) lent it, the lender at the time enabled the borrower to do business with it.

Abstention from interest means receiving profit only from one's present possessions. (This, by the way, is the principle underlying a hetter iska.[463] Part of the money remains the property of the lender, who entrusts it to the borrower as no more than a deposit, and the lender receives profit only from that part of the investment that remains his now. A similar principle underlies contracts for the hiring of animals or utensils.)

In the same spirit as a Jew relates to his fellow, in that same spirit is he himself related to from above. If he transgresses the prohibition against taking interest, by receiving profit now because he had lent money in the past, then from above he is related to in the very same spirit. That is to say, his current divine service is (as it were) not accompanied by participation from above;[464] there is only a giving of "money" (i.e., the strength [endowed by] the Divine fulfillment of the commandments) that precedes the opening of his avodah-"business"; he is given [no more than] the strength to carry out his avodah. If, instead, he observes the commandment concerning interest, then from above he is related to in the very same spirit. Not only is he granted the initial strength required for his service, but there is ongoing Divine participation in the course of the avodah itself:438 "[As] he reads the Torah, the Holy One, Blessed be He, reads and repeats in step with him."

This, then, is what connects the commandment concerning interest with one's acceptance of the yoke of heaven and with the Exodus from Egypt. For the mitzvah concerning interest constitutes an all-embracing[465] principle, a spiritual scheme by means of which G-d becomes (so to speak) a partner in a Jew's avodah of accepting the yoke of heaven, and expressing this through the performance of the mitzvos. Being thereby bound to G-d, this individual steps out of all the straits and bounds that would inhibit his service of G-d. And this liberation of his soul from its straits (meitzarim) is a veritable Exodus from Egypt (Mitzrayim).[466]

6. "Tzaddikim Resemble Their Creator."

As[467] explained above, G-d not only initially gives a man the strength needed to serve Him through Torah study and the observance of the mitzvos, but thereafter, too, while he is in fact observing them, G-d Himself observes the same mitzvos. The conduct of tzaddikim is (so to speak) the same; this is especially true of every Nasi of Israel, of every tzaddik who is the spiritual leader of his generation, an intermediary who connects his contemporaries with G-d.[468] Not only do tzaddikim give their emissaries[469] the strength to carry out their respective missions, but moreover, they themselves also engage in the same avodah with which they have charged their emissaries.

This course of action was especially apparent in the case of my revered father-in-law, the Rebbe [Rayatz]. He not only dispatched emissaries and lent them the strength to labor in the buttressing of Jewish practice in general and in the dissemination of the wellsprings of Chassidus in particular. Beyond that -- not only in his earlier years, but also in his later years, after he had raised up disciples and the disciples of disciples who themselves were equipped to do so -- he always dedicated himself utterly to continuing this work.

This practice serves as a directive to all those who are bound to him and who walk in his footsteps. Let them not be satisfied with the fact that they have raised up disciples who are already engaged in the dissemination of Torah and Chassidus. Let them not calculate that since their disciples' labors were sparked by their influence, it follows that they themselves, the mashpi'im, will benefit from the additional Divine light that was elicited by their disciples' endeavors, that they will therefore now be exempt from being concerned with the needs of others, and will now be able to devote themselves to their own Torah study. Such a course of action -- receiving profit (augmented light) in exchange for one's endeavors in the past -- smacks of interest. Rather, such individuals should be constantly engaged not only with themselves, but with the needs of others as well: they should continue to do the very same tasks that are expected of their disciples.

In reward for such a course of action, which amounts to a vigilant avoidance of the prohibition against taking interest, they will be privileged in their own private avodah to enjoy the participation of my revered father-in-law, the Nasi of this generation. Through him, in turn -- since he[470] "stands between G-d and yourselves" -- they will be blessed with the participation of G-d: they will be blessed with the acceptance of the yoke of heaven. And through this, they will each undergo a personal Exodus from their spiritual Mitzrayim, by becoming liberated from all the straits and inhibitions that encumber their avodah.

7. Tithing with Integrity.

[In[471] connection with the consecration of every tenth animal of one's herds and flocks as they pass under their owner's rod,] we learn towards the end of this week's Torah reading (viz., Parshas Behar-Bechukosai):[472] "One may not discriminate between a good and a poor [animal], nor may one substitute; if a substitution is made, then both [the original animal] and its replacement shall be consecrated."

The Rambam explains:[473] "It appears to me that the Torah determined that 'both [the original animal] and its replacement shall be consecrated'... because the Torah plumbed the underlying thoughts of man and something of his Evil Inclination. For by nature a person seeks to increase his possessions and to be sparing with his money. Hence, even though he has made a vow and consecrated [an animal] he may possibly relent, and redeem it for less than its real worth.... [Thus,] if [the Torah] would permit him to exchange a poor animal for a good one, he might well exchange the good animal for a poor one and say that it is good. The Torah therefore made an unqualified prohibition against substitution and fined him if he transgresses, by determining that 'both [the original animal] and its replacement shall be consecrated.' "

In other words: Even though in principle the law[474] should have permitted the substitution "of a poor animal for a good one," nevertheless, since "the Torah plumbed the underlying thoughts of man...," so that "if it would permit him to exchange a poor animal for a good one, he might well exchange the good animal for a poor one and say that it is good," the Torah ordained that it be forbidden to exchange (even) "a poor animal for a good one."

This case allows us to settle the classic debate[475] as to the definition of gezeirah -- an ordinance which forbids something which is essentially permitted, because of an extraneous consideration. From our case it is clear that a gezeirah is not (only) an addition instituted by the Sages; rather, in the Torah itself certain prohibitions belong to the category of gezeirah -- as in our case, where the prohibition to exchange a poor animal for a good one is in fact a gezeirah ordained so that one will not "exchange a good animal for a poor one and say that it is good."

8. Accepting One's Appointed Tasks.

What does this prohibition mean in terms of a chassid's avodah?

A person might consider that it would be preferable for him to engage in some field of avodah which he holds to be superior to that which has been demanded of him; for this reason, he might argue, he would rather exchange the inferior field for the superior one.

When, for example, chassidim are urged to go out and disseminate a knowledge of Yiddishkeit, some individual might argue that such simple tasks can be entrusted to anyone, while he himself should engage in loftier matters, such as the study of Chassidus. Conversely, too, when chassidim are urged to study Chassidus, some individual might argue that he himself is unworthy of this: since his understanding of Chassidus is not so profound, it would be preferable that he concentrate on other fields of avodah.

In effect, his argument in either case is that he would like his sacrifice -- his life-task of drawing near to G-d[476] -- to be superior; he would like it to consist of a kind of avodah which is loftier, or which he perceives as superior because he considers himself to be more suited to it.

The response to such arguments is the statement of the Torah, that "one may not discriminate between good and bad, nor may one substitute": one is not even permitted to exchange something bad for something good, as will presently be explained.

9. Taking the Rebbe's Advice.

It can happen that a person's desire to exchange something bad for something good grows out of a mistaken calculation which in turn is prompted by his Evil Inclination, whereas the particular field of avodah which is being asked of him is in fact the best possible.

An incident by way of illustration: A certain Californian timber dealer once entered the study of my revered father-in-law, the Rebbe [Rayatz], for yechidus. After receiving replies to his business questions he proceeded to ask about the education of his children, but the directive which the Rebbe gave him in reply was not to his liking.

The Rebbe said: "Consider. When it came to the timber business, in which I have never engaged, you traveled a great distance to ask for my advice, but when it comes to the education of your children, which is my occupation (and which was also the occupation of my forebears), you don't accept my advice?!"

This applies too to our subject. Since the Rebbe [Rayatz] charged a particular individual with a certain mission, it is clear that for him this is the best possible shlichus, even if it appears to him -- after promptings from the Evil Inclination -- that it would be preferable to exchange it for another.

Moreover, even if there were truth to his claim that it would be preferable to exchange his field of avodah for another, to replace something bad by something better, nevertheless, "one may not discriminate between something good and something bad, nor may one substitute."

10. Pious Rationalizations.

Why the above prohibition? -- "Because the Torah plumbed the underlying thoughts of man and something of his Evil Inclination.... If [the Torah] would permit him to exchange a poor animal for a good one, he might well exchange the good animal for a poor one and say that it is good."

In this connection the Sages teach:[477] "This is how the Evil Inclination plies his craft. Today he tells a man, 'Do this,' and tomorrow he tells him, 'Do that' -- until one day he tells him, 'Serve [idols]!' "

My revered father-in-law, the Rebbe [Rayatz], used to explain this as follows:[478] The Evil Inclination does not approach a man and say, "Do a sin" (G-d forbid), for then he would certainly not heed him. Instead, when the Yetzer HaRa finds this man studying Torah and observing the commandments he says, "Do this!" That is to say, "I (the Evil Inclination) agree that you should study Torah and observe the commandments, because your Torah study is so priceless that G-d Himself and all the hosts of heaven delight in it...."

(The Yetzer HaRa grants his consent by injecting ego[479] into the avodah of Torah study and mitzvah observance, even though -- cloaked in sanctimonious holiness -- he claims that his intentions are directed purely for the sake of heaven.

"You really must study Torah," the Yetzer HaRa explains, "but not for your own sake, so that you will be secured a place in the Garden of Eden; for even if you were to find yourself in Gehinnom you would no doubt be paid a visit there by G-d Himself and by holy hosts of angels who would want to hear your original interpretations of the finer points of Torah law.... No, the reason you must study Torah is your concern for the consummate perfection of Gan Eden. Just imagine: if the Patriarchs and the tannaim and amoraim are all assembled there in Gan Eden and you're not there, then the consummate perfection of Gan Eden will be found wanting....")

Once the Yetzer HaRa has told this individual, "Do this," thereby expressing his consent that the Torah should be studied and the commandments should be observed for reasons of ego, he can then come along and tell him, "Do that" -- until one day he tells him, "Serve...!" In other words, the involvement of ego in one's avodah is the root from which there may ultimately sprout a situation in which the Evil Inclination says, "Serve...!"

The way to cope with this is to fulfill one's appointed mission without indulging in any calculations, following the above principle -- "One may not discriminate between something good and something bad, nor may one substitute" -- in a spirit of self-effacement and unquestioning acceptance.[480]

This attitude is fundamental to all avodah, as may be seen from the following verse, with which this passage concludes:[481] "These are the commandments which G-d gave Moshe for the Children of Israel at Mount Sinai."

11. Holy Letters.

The[482] venerable chassid R. David Zvi Chein used to teach his grandson Mishnayos. One day, when the grandson did not grasp a certain explanation of the text, R. David Zvi consoled him: "These are holy letters...."

12. It Takes One Minute.

When my revered father-in-law, the Rebbe [Rayatz] was leaving Vienna, he was accompanied to the railway station by a number of German Jews. As departure time drew near, one of them consulted his precise watch and informed the Rebbe, "One minute left!"

Replied the Rebbe, "So there's still time to do teshuvah."

   

Notes:

433. (Back to text) From a sichah delivered on Shabbos Parshas Behar-Bechukosai, Shabbos Mevarchim Sivan, 5710 [1950]. Sec. 1-6 of the above talk appear in Likkutei Sichos, Vol. III, p. 1007ff.

434. (Back to text) Vayikra 25:36.

435. (Back to text) For not only the lender, but the borrower too transgresses (cf. Devarim 23:20); see the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, beginning of Hilchos Ribbis.

436. (Back to text) Vayikra 25:38.

437. (Back to text) In the original, ol (lit., "yoke").

438. (Back to text) Bava Metzia 61b.

439. (Back to text) See also the commentary of Kli Yakar on the above verse.

440. (Back to text) In the original, bitachon.

441. (Back to text) In the original, gemilus chassadim, the most praiseworthy level of tzedakah; see Rambam, Hilchos Matnos Aniyim 10:7.

442. (Back to text) Vayikra 25:35.

443. (Back to text) In the original, birkos hamitzvos.

444. (Back to text) In the original, over le'asiyasan; see Pesachim 7b, and sources indicated there.

445. (Back to text) Likkutei Torah, Parshas Vaeschanan, p. 9d; op.cit., Shir HaShirim, p. 12a.

446. (Back to text) This is explained (among other places) in the maamar [of the Rebbe Rayatz] delivered on Lag BaOmer 5699 [1939], and appearing in Sefer HaMaamarim 5710 [1950], p. 209ff.

447. (Back to text) See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. III, p. 958, footnote 11, and the sources referred to there.

448. (Back to text) Shmos Rabbah 30:9.

449. (Back to text) Tanna dvei Eliyahu Rabbah, beginning of sec. 18; Yalkut Shimoni on Eichah, Remez 1034.

450. (Back to text) This is also true in the simplest sense regarding an individual's avodah, as explained towards the end of the maamar of Lag BaOmer (loc. cit.) cited above in footnote 435.

451. (Back to text) In the original, kol hahashpaos.

452. (Back to text) In the Heb./Aram. original, bederech isarusa dil'eila (lit., "by way of an arousal from Above").

453. (Back to text) In the original, kdei leheitiv libruav; Etz Chayim, at the beginning of Shaar HaKlalim.

454. (Back to text) In the original, teva hatov leheitiv; see R. Zvi Hirsch Ashkenazi, Chacham Zvi (Responsa), sec 18, and R. Yosef Irgas, Shomer Emunim 2:14, quoting Kabbalistic sources. (Cited in Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, ch. 4; see Lessons In Tanya, Vol. III, p. 862.)

455. (Back to text) Rashi on Bereishis 1:1, and elsewhere. See also Sefer HaMaamarim 5710 [1950], p. 141: "The Jewish people are the world's crowning glory...."

456. (Back to text) Cf. the Jerusalem Talmud, Tractate Orlah 1:3; see also Likkutei Torah, Parshas Tzav, p. 7d.

457. (Back to text) Now in truth, as mentioned above, this entitlement is based not on the intrinsic worth of mortal avodah (for the created and the Creator are infinitely incomparable), but only on the fact that such is the Will of the Creator. Nevertheless, once it has been made known that the Divine Will indeed determines that the divine service of created beings should be a consequential act, this determination becomes fact. (Cf. the explanation in Derech Mitzvosecha, p. 54b.) [-- Note by the Rebbe.]

458. (Back to text) Toras Kohanim on Vayikra 25:43 (cited by Rashi there). See also the maamar beginning Karov HaShem 5690 [1930], sec. 2 (in Sefer HaMaamarim -- Kuntreisim, Vol. I, p. 105b).

459. (Back to text) See: Sefer HaSichos 5680-87 [1920-27], p. 27; Sefer HaSichos 5696-5700 [1936-1940], p. 114ff.

460. (Back to text) If not for the strength lent from above, the individual would not be able to contend with his yetzer hara. In the words of the Sages, "If not for G-d's help, he would not be able to cope with him" (see Sukkah 52b and references indicated there).

461. (Back to text) Cf. the maamar beginning Vayikach Haman in the Hosafos (Addenda) to Torah Or.

462. (Back to text) In the original, Atzmuso U'Mehuso yisbarech.

463. (Back to text) A business agreement that makes it possible to invest without infringement of the prohibition of interest.

464. (Back to text) On the connection between the above statement and the teaching of our Sages that one who lends money on interest will not rise at the Resurrection of the Dead, see the sichah of Shabbos Parshas Mishpatim, 5723 [1963].

465. (Back to text) Cf. the teaching of the Sages (Shmos Rabbah 31:4) that one who lends without interest is regarded "as if he had observed all the commandments." For by fulfilling the commandment concerning interest an entire world order is set up, whereby G-d becomes a partner in all of his mitzvos.

466. (Back to text) Cf. Tanya, ch. 47.

467. (Back to text) The source for the preceding quotation is Bamidbar Rabbah 10:5.

468. (Back to text) See Sefer HaSichos -- Toras Shalom, p. 158.

469. (Back to text) In the original, shluchim.

470. (Back to text) Devarim 5:5.

471. (Back to text) Sec. 7-10 (above) appear in the Hosafos (Addenda) to Likkutei Sichos, Vol. XVII, p. 527ff.

472. (Back to text) Vayikra 27:33 (and see also v. 10).

473. (Back to text) Hilchos Temurah 4:13.

474. (Back to text) In the original, mei'ikar hadin.

475. (Back to text) On this debate (in the Aram. original, shakla vetarya), see Lekach Tov by Mahari (R. Yosef) Engel, Klal 8.

476. (Back to text) On the more-than-etymological connection between korban ("sacrifice") and kiruv ("drawing near"), see Sefer HaMaamarim 5710 [1950], p. 113; and elsewhere.

477. (Back to text) Shabbos 105b.

478. (Back to text) Sefer HaMaamarim -- Kuntreisim, Vol. I, p. 37a; and elsewhere.

479. (Back to text) In the original, yeshus.

480. (Back to text) In the original, bittul and kabbalas ol.

481. (Back to text) Vayikra 27:34.

482. (Back to text) The statements recorded in Sec. 11 and 12 (above) were made in the course of the farbrengen, though their context has not been recalled.